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Summary  
The success of a waterway construction or maintenance project is strongly dependent 
on the management of risk. Striving for better results in their projects, the Finnish 
Transport Agency (FTA) had recognized the need to improve the resources, tools and 
guidelines available for the risk management of waterway projects. However, the 
target is ambiguous, as the optimal approach to risk management cannot be explicitly 
defined. There are no objective means available for determining an optimal approach 
to risk management, and there are no risk management standards which would 
explicitly discuss projects conducted in the context of a larger organization. Instead, 
various international and national standards and guidelines exist for risk 
management, each focusing on their own subject matter. Therefore, the first question 
one must ask in order to develop the practice of risk management is how does one 
determine which standard or guideline is the most valid in a given context? 
In this thesis, a literature review, several expert interviews, and an expert survey were 
used to gather information about the theory and the current state of waterway project 
risk management in Finland. This was supported by a limited amount of information 
from Sweden and Denmark. The FTA waterway risk management framework, which 
includes the guidelines, tools, human resources, policies, processes and commitment 
available for managing risk, was evaluated utilizing the ISO 31004:2013 technical 
report for the implementation of the ISO 31000:2009 standard for risk management. 
This evaluation result was used to identify the possibilities of developing the risk 
management framework. Based on these results, the following risk management tools 
and processes were developed:  
 three risk management processes tied to the structures of waterway projects, 
 three hazard checklists,  
 the inclusion of opportunity management,  
 the enhancement of the risk analysis process, and  
 a model for the establishment of the context of the risk management process 
 
The tools and processes were validated through case studies and user group testing, 
based on which the feasibility of the enhancements was assessed. Finally, 
recommendations were made for the development of the waterway project risk 
management framework 
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Tiivistelmä 
Vesiväylien rakentamis- ja kunnossapidon projektien onnistuminen riippuu 
merkittävästi riskienhallinnasta. Tavoitteenaan edistää riskienhallintaa vesiväylä-
projekteissa, Liikennevirasto oli havainnut tarpeen kehittää vesiväylähankkeita 
palvelevia riskienhallinnan resursseja, työkaluja ja ohjeita. Ei kuitenkaan ole täysin 
selvää, millaiseen riskienhallintaan tulisi pyrkiä. Ei ole olemassa objektiivista tapaa 
määritellä optimaalinen lähestymistapa riskienhallintaan, eikä yksikään riskien-
hallinnan standardi suoraan käsittele projekteja, jotka toteutetaan osana laajempaa 
organisaatiota. Vaikka useampi kansainvälinen ja kansallinen standardi ja ohje 
käsittelevät riskienhallintaa, ne huomioivat vain oman erikoisalueensa. Ensimmäinen 
kysymys vesiväyläprojektien riskienhallinnan kehittämisessä kuuluikin, kuinka 
määritellään, mikä riskienhallinnan standardi tai ohje soveltuu tarkoitukseen 
parhaiten. 
Diplomityössä kerättiin ensin tietoa vesiväyläprojektien riskienhallintaan 
sovellettavasta teoriasta sekä tämänhetkisistä käytännöistä Suomessa, Ruotsissa 
sekä Tanskassa. Tiedon hankinnan menetelminä käytettiin kirjallisuuskatsausta, 
asiantuntijahaastatteluita sekä asiantuntijoille suunnattua kyselyä. Liikenneviraston 
vesiväylähankkeiden riskienhallinnan puitteita, eli mm. ohjeita, työkaluja, resursseja, 
politiikkaa, prosesseja ja sitoutumista arvioitiin käyttäen riskienhallinnan standardin 
ISO 31000:2009 jalkauttamisohjetta ISO 31004:2013. Arvioinnin perusteella 
tunnistettiin ensin riskienhallinnan puitteiden kehitysmahdollisuuksia, ja sen 
perusteella kehitettiin seuraavat riskienhallinnan työkalut ja prosessit: 
 kolme vesiväylähankkeiden läpivientiin sidottua riskienhallinnan prosessia, 
 kolme vaarojen tarkistuslistaa, 
 mahdollisuuksien hallinnan sisällyttäminen riskienhallinnan prosessiin, 
 riskianalyysin parannuksia, sekä 
 malli riskienhallinnan toimintaympäristön määrittelylle. 
 
Kehitettyjen työkalujen ja prosessien toimivuutta tarkasteltiin tapaustutkimusten ja 
käyttäjäryhmätestauksen avulla, joiden perustella arvioitiin työkalujen ja prosessien 
hyödyllisyyttä ja toimivuutta. Lopuksi tehtiin suosituksia vesiväyläprojektien riskien-
hallinnan puitteiden kehittämiselle. 
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Sammandrag 
Hur projekt för byggande och underhåll av farleder lyckas beror i väsentlig grad på 
riskhanteringen. I syfte att främja riskhanteringen vid farledsprojekt hade Trafikverket 
upptäckt att det finns ett behov att utveckla resurser, verktyg och anvisningar som 
betjänar riskhanteringen vid dessa projekt. Det är ändå inte helt klart vilken typ av 
riskhantering man borde eftersträva. Det finns inget objektivt sätt att definiera en 
optimal infallsvinkel på riskhantering, och ingen standard för riskhantering handlar 
direkt om projekt som genomförs som en del av en större organisation. Trots att flera 
internationella och nationella standarder och anvisningar behandlar riskhantering, 
fokuserar dessa endast på sina egna specialområden. Den första frågan i utvecklingen 
av riskhanteringen vid farledsprojekt var således hur man definierar vilken risk-
hanteringsstandard eller anvisning som är bäst lämpad för ändamålet. 
I diplomarbetet samlade man först in information om en teori som kan tillämpas på 
riskhantering vid farledsprojekt samt information om praxis som för närvarande 
tillämpas i Finland, Sverige och Danmark. Som metoder för inhämtning av 
information användes litteraturöversikt, intervjuer med experter samt en förfrågan 
som riktades till experter. Ramverk för riskhantering vid Trafikverkets farledsprojekt, 
dvs. bl.a. anvisningar, verktyg, resurser, politik, processer och engagemang bedömdes 
via standarden för riskhantering ISO 31000:2009 och anvisningen ISO 31004:2013. 
Utifrån bedömningen identifierades först möjligheterna att utveckla ramverket för 
riskhantering och på basis av detta utvecklades följande verktyg och processer för 
riskhantering: 
 tre riskhanteringsprocesser bundna till genomdrivande av farledsprojekt 
 tre checklistor för faror 
 inkludera hanteringen av möjligheter i riskhanteringsprocessen 
 förbättringar i riskanalysen 
 modell för definition av riskhanteringsmiljön. 
Funktionen hos de utvecklade verktygen och processerna kontrollerades genom fall-
studier och ett test av en användargrupp. Utifrån dessa bedömde man verktygens och 
processernas nytta och funktion. Till sist gav man rekommendationer för utveckling 
av ramverk för riskhantering vid farledsprojekt. 
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Foreword 
The management of risk has a major impact to the successfulness of waterway 
projects, independent of whether the risks are managed consciously – or 
unconsciously. This thesis aims to clarify and develop the risk management practices 
in the waterway construction and maintenance projects of the Finnish Transport 
Agency. 
This thesis was written and the corresponding research conducted by Oliver Heinonen 
from Aalto University. The thesis work was steered and advised by Dr Arja Toola, Tero 
Sikiö and Marko Reilimo from the Finnish Transport Agency, and by Outi Lehti from 
Ramboll CM Ltd. Their academic counterparts were the supervisor of this work, 
Professor Terhi Pellinen, and advisor Dr Jakub Montewka from Aalto University. 
Helsinki, September 2016 
Finnish Transport Agency 
Project Planning Department 
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Abbreviations and terms 
ALARP As Low As Reasonably Practicable – is used to describe a level of risk 
which is optimal in comparison with the cost of the further potential 
treatment or mitigating actions. 
ERM  Enterprise Risk Management – consists of active and intrusive 
processes that (1) are capable of challenging existing assumptions 
about the world within and outside the organization; (2) communicate 
risk information with the use of distinct tools (such as risk maps, 
stress tests, and scenarios); (3) collectively address gaps in the 
control of risks that other control functions (such as internal audit 
and other boundary controls) leave unaddressed; and, in doing so, (4) 
complement – but do not displace – existing management control 
practices. (definition by Mikes & Kaplan 2014).  
Essential tools of RM   
(FI: Riskienhallinnan perustyökalut) – Comprises of the following four 
tools,): SWOT-analysis, risk map, risk management form, and risk 
matrix. (Liikennevirasto 2015).  
FTA Finnish Transport Agency (FI: Liikennevirasto) 
ISO International Organization for Standardization 
Project A project is a temporary endeavour to create a unique product, 
service, or result. The temporary nature of projects indicates that a 
project has a definite beginning and end.  The end is reached when 
the projects objectives have been achieved or when the project is 
terminated because its objectives will not or cannot be met, or the 
when the need for the project no longer exists. (PMI 2013:3). 
Risk An unexpected negative or positive situation or event, which prevents 
or disturbs the realization of objectives, process or action, or provides 
new possibilities for achieving them. Risk has a magnitude, which is 
quantified based on the probability and the severity of consequences. 
This is the definition is by the FTA (Liikennevirasto 2015) – see also 
the definition of ISO 31000:2009 in Section 2.4. 
RA Risk assessment is a systematic process consisting of risk 
identification, risk analysis and risk evaluation. (ISO 31000:2009 and 
Liikennevirasto 2015). 
RM Risk management is a systematic process consisting of establishing 
the risk management context, risk assessment, risk treatment, 
monitoring and reviewing, and communication and consulting. (ISO 
31000:2009 and Liikennevirasto 2015). 
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RM framework  
The set of components that provide the foundations and 
organizational arrangements for designing, implementing, 
monitoring, reviewing and continually improving risk management 
throughout the organization, see also Section 2.4. (ISO 31000:2009). 
RM plan Scheme within the risk management framework specifying the 
approach, the management components and resources to be applied 
to the management of risk 
RM approach  The manner in which a risk management problem is solved.   
11 
 
  
1 Introduction 
1.1 Research background 
A majority of the international freight across the borders of Finland is transported by 
freight vessels, which navigate the archipelago along specific waterways. These 
waterways are constructed and maintained by the Finnish Transport Agency (FTA). 
The construction and maintenance work is divided into individual projects, where 
private service providers conduct the practical work while the FTA reserves the role of 
a client. The projects come with different complexities and magnitudes, ranging from 
the Baltic Sea waterway deepening projects to the replacement of a few navigation 
marks on a freshwater lake. 
These projects face numerous risks, or uncertainties related to the achievement of 
project objectives. These risks arise, for example, from the ambiguity of the contract 
and tender documents, or from the lack of knowledge about the time required for 
dredging work. The responsibility for navigating the field of project risk lies primarily 
on the client who uses the tender process and contracting to transfer a share of that 
risk to the service provider. The risks faced in these projects are perhaps best 
demonstrated through the hazard checklists in the Appendix A6.2 Hazard checklists, 
and in Liikennevirasto (2012).  
The success of a project is more or less dependent on the success of the management 
of project risk. However, the success of project risk management is determined by a 
number of factors, most of which exceed the boundaries of single projects in an 
organization such as the FTA. These factors include e.g. the guidelines, tools, human 
resources, policies, processes and commitment available for managing risk, which 
together form a risk management framework. Thus, in order to evaluate or develop the 
risk management approach in individual waterway projects, one must consider all the 
factors of the risk management framework. 
For the application of risk management to waterway construction and maintenance 
projects by the FTA, the role of risk management has been to control the 
environmental, health and safety risk. The FTA’s general approach has recently been 
adapted towards a wider perspective on project risk. Nevertheless, while the 
guidelines and policy for risk management have been adapted to include financial and 
schedule risk, the available tools and processes have not.  It should be noted, that not 
all risk management is necessarily good – on the contrary, Hubbard (2008) argues 
that in some cases bad risk management can lead to worse results than with no risk 
management at all. 
Systematically striving for better results in their projects, the FTA had recognized the 
need to develop the risk management framework for the use of waterway project risk 
management. In theory, optimal risk management reduces the amount of risk up to a 
level, where the means and the cost of reducing the risk matches the benefits of the 
reduction. However, it is not completely clear, what kind of risk management 
produces the optimal results in practice. There are no objective means available for 
determining an optimal approach to risk management, and there are no standards, 
which would explicitly discuss projects conducted in the context of a larger 
12 
 
 
organization. Instead, the field spans a number of standards and guidelines for risk 
management, each focusing on their own subject matter – so, when concerned about 
waterway construction and maintenance projects inside an organization, should one 
expect to find the optimal risk management approach in the risk management 
standard for organizations, enterprises, projects, or perhaps waterway traffic? It 
appears that the field of risk management is fairly immature, despite – or because of 
the vast number of standards. 
The FTA’s current risk management approach for infrastructure projects is based on 
the risk management standard ISO 31000:2009, although the standard has not been 
thoroughly implemented. The ISO standard is complemented with a technical report 
for its implementation, the ISO 31004:2013, which describes a process for the 
evaluation of the current practice through the comparison of the practice with the 
standard. This evaluation process was perceived as the necessary tool for 
understanding the shortcomings and the connections of the current practice. 
1.2 Research objectives 
The objective of the research was to improve the practice of risk management in 
waterway projects in Finland, while providing theoretical contribution through the 
framework of constructive research. In other words, the objectives of the research 
were to: 
1. Analyse and clarify the FTA risk management framework for waterway 
construction and maintenance projects while suggesting improvements, and 
2. Develop risk management constructs (tools and processes) for the application of 
the improvements in practice. 
The constructs were to be designed from the point-of-view of being used by the 
management of waterway projects. The constructs primarily serve FTA project 
managers in conducting risk management in their projects, and secondarily the 
various service providers in these projects. 
1.3 Scope and limitations 
The scope of this research spans the construction and maintenance of the FTA 
governed waterways in Finland. Thus, the planning phase of waterways is outside the 
scope of this work. 
The designed risk management constructs focus on the bottom-up, or micro-level 
ERM approach, describing the risk management manoeuvres conducted by the project 
management to address local-level risks, as described by Nocco & Stulz (2006). 
These are described by the FTA (2016) as operational risks. 
The scope of the research includes the whole variety of risks a waterway project can 
be vulnerable to. These include e.g. financial, safety and environmental concerns. 
The accountabilities, relationships, and human or financial resources internal to a 
project were not in the scope of this work. Also the planning of the practical 
implementation of the risk management constructs in the FTA organization was not 
included in the scope of this work.  
13 
 
  
2 Literature review 
2.1 Theoretical background of the research 
Although this research focuses on the project level of RM in waterway environment, 
the organization or enterprise perspective is adopted for interpreting the success or 
failure of the RM in an organization encompassing several projects. In other words, 
the assumption is made, that the organizational, or enterprise risk management 
(ERM) approach applies to single projects in a larger organization, and that the micro-
level benefits of ERM can be sought for without accounting for the organization-level 
benefits (as described by Nocco & Stulz 2006).  
In order to successfully analyse and develop an ERM framework, a theory, or a basis 
for that analysis is required. However, as Mikes & Kaplan (2014) and Bromiley et al. 
(2015) argue, no established theory exists, which would explain the success of one 
risk management approach over the other in the field of ERM. 
To cap the hole, Mikes & Kaplan (2014) propose the contingency theory, which claims 
that the success of a given ERM practice or “mix” depends on the contingent 
variables, such as the managed risk types and the industry. In other words, they 
suggest that risk management will be most effective when it matches the inherent 
nature and controllability of the different types of risk the organization faces. Mikes & 
Kaplan propose a “minimum necessary contingency framework” (Figure 1) for the 
basis of practical use of the contingency theory.  
In the case of the relatively new and unestablished contingency theory, a “common 
body of knowledge” describing the best combinations of factors is not readily 
available. Therefore, to provide a measure for the organizational effectiveness of an 
ERM approach, Mikes & Kaplan (2014) following Otley (1980) suggest using user 
satisfaction surveys and managerial perceptions of the ERM function as potential 
indicators.  
Contingency theory suggests that an ERM mix should be divided into its fundamental 
RM components for its observation and development. This is also the suggested 
approach for implementing the RM standard ISO 31000:2009; the technical report 
ISO 31004:2013 suggests the evaluation of an organization’s RM practice against the 
ISO 31000:2009. Thus it is assumed that the implementation process described in 
ISO 31004:2013 is in line with the contingency theory, and will provide the necessary 
information for this research to contribute to the knowledge on the practical 
application of the theory.  
The choice of using the ISO standard family as the basis for the approach in this 
research was influenced by the FTA’s use of the RM standard ISO 31000:2009 as the 
primary reference for both the organization-scale and infrastructure project scale RM 
guidelines (Liikennevirasto 2015 and 2016d). The implementation level of the ISO 
31000:2009 to the FTA waterway project RM practices is analysed in Section 4.3.  
14 
Yet it should be noted, that there is no guarantee that the ISO 31000:2009 describes 
the best RM solution for waterway projects – the ISO 31004:2013 is merely seen here 
as an adequate practical guideline for facilitating the analysis of the current waterway 
project RM approach.
Instead, the field of project risk management research could equally well provide 
adequate tools for waterway project RM – especially when dealing with large, complex 
projects with multiple organizations, where project successes are clearly linked with 
higher level of RM implementation (Harvett 2013).
CONTINGENT VARIABLES
• RISK TYPES (PREVENTABLE, 
STRATEGY, EXTERNAL)
• FIRM VARIABLES
• INDUSTRY VARIABLES
INTERVENING VARIABLES
E.G.
• MANAGERIAL SATISFACTION
• TENURE OF RISK FUNCTION
ORGANIZATIONAL EFFECTIVENESS
ERM MIX
• ERM DESIGN PARAMETERS
• RISK IDENTIFICATION PROCESSES
• RISK ASSESSMENT FREQUENCY
• RISK MANAGEMENT TOOLS
• THE ROLES OF RISK FUNCTION
Figure 1:  The minimum necessary contingency framework of the contingency
  theory, adopted from Mikes & Kaplan 2014.
The theoretical connection between ERM and project RM in the context of this thesis is 
further explored below in Section 2.2.
15
2.2 A theoretical approach to project RM 
As the ERM approach should look at the RM processes from the organizational level, 
and is thus appropriate for the organization to pursue its collective goals, the actions of 
the individual waterway project and project risk managers are assumed to more likely 
reflect the goals of individual projects. Given this assumption, the waterway project risk 
management framework would need to be able to reflect the environment of individual 
waterway projects in a way that also assists in the pursuing of organization-level goals.
 
However, the question of how projects and their subsequent risks should be managed is 
all but clear. What the scholars (and some of the practitioners) of project management 
collectively appear to agree on, is that the most functional management approaches 
reflect the project properties, such as the project complexity, and thus vary between 
projects (Harvett 2013, Atkinson et al. 2006, and Lehtiranta 2014). This is in line with 
the contingency theory of ERM (Mikes & Kaplan 2014), and from an organization’s 
management’s perspective might call for a similar “common body of knowledge” as 
the contingency theory.
The PMBOK – the Project Management Body of Knowledge (PMI 2013) – answers the 
problem from the point-of-view of conventional project management. However, the 
risk management approach in PMBOK is shallow, and doesn’t account for all of the 
varying properties of project risk. “Perhaps the conventional common view of project 
management is essentially to see the project task as a set of processes to ensure a 
project meets its (predetermined) objectives. Then the whole raison d’etre of project 
management is to remove (or substantially reduce) uncertainty about meeting specified 
objectives. However, project management in this sense is a castle built on shifting sands 
if in practice objectives are unclear, contradictory, or impossible. Many endeavours 
recognised and ‘managed’ as projects experience problems for this reason.” (Atkinson 
et al. 2006).
1. GOAL CLARITY
2. GOAL TANGIBILITY
3. SUCCESS MEASURES
4. PROJECT PERMEABILITY
5. NUMBER OF SOLUTION OPTIONS
6. PARTICIPATION AND PRACTITIONER ROLE
7. STAKEHOLDER EXPECTATIONS
FRAMEWORK
GOALS/OBJECTIVES CLEARLY DEFINED
PHYSICAL ARTEFACT
ONLY QUANTITATIVE MEASURES
NOT SUBJECT TO EXTERNAL INFLUENCES
REFINEMENT OF SINGLE SOLUTION
EXPERT PRACTITIONER, NO STAKEHOLDER 
PARTICIPATION
VALUES TECHNICAL PERFORMANCE AND 
EFFICIENCY, MANAGES BY MONITORING 
ANC CONTROL
GOALS/OBJECTIVES AMBIGOUSLY DEFINED
ABSTRACT CONCEPT
ONLY QUALITATIVE MEASURES
HIGHLY SUBJECT TO EXTERNAL INFLUENCES
EXPLORATION OF MANY ALTERNATIVE 
SOLUTIONS
FACILITATIVE PRACTITIONER, HIGH 
STAKEHOLDER INVOLVEMENT
VALUES RELATIONSHIPS, CULTURE AND 
MEANING, MANGES BY NEGOTIATION AND 
DISCUSSION
Figure 2:  The seven dimensions of project hardness and softness, adapted from
  Crawford & Pollack (2004:650).
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These varying properties include at least the perceived hardness vs. softness of 
projects, relating to the amount of needed disciplines and the strength of the 
predefined project objectives (Atkinson et al. 2006, Harvett 2013). Crawford & Pollack 
(2004:650) describe the seven dimensions of hardness and softness of projects, 
illustrated in Figure 2. Another such property is project complexity, which is explored 
for example by Harvett (2013).  
However, the question of how to choose the correct or best approach for each 
project’s risk management is still left unanswered. This might call for a similar answer 
as the contingency theory of ERM – a common body of knowledge for project RM 
approaches, with the ability to differentiate between the variables with significant 
effect on the approach functionality and effectivity. 
2.3 Waterways and waterway projects in 
Finland  
Waterway as a structure 
From an engineering point-of-view, a waterway can be described as an underwater 
3D-space: a guaranteed water depth delimited from the sides with virtual lines. The 
places of these lines and a ship’s position in relation to them are acknowledged by the 
navigator based on the on-board navigation system – or, if the technology should fail, 
the navigator is guided by a map and a compass, using the help of sea-marks placed 
along the route. On the top of the surface the 3D-space continues as guaranteed 
space above the route, where the possible bridge structures or power lines keep away. 
(Liikennevirasto 2013). 
The construction process of such waterways is relatively simple compared to e.g. 
construction of buildings: one measures the concurrent depth of the water inside the 
given 3D-space, dredges away the extra, and places the sea-marks along the route in 
accordance to the plans: either as floating buoys anchored to the bottom or as solid 
structures on ground. Some sea-marks include electronic parts, such as lights and 
power devices, others reflect radar signals, but most work as simple visual aids with 
reflective surfaces. 
The maintenance works are in principle not much more complicated: one ensures that 
the seamarks are in a good enough condition to fulfil their task and sees to that the 
route depths have not shallowed during the flow of time, due to e.g. erosion outside 
the given 3D-space. Maintenance also includes here the management of registers and 
the conducting of certain enhancement projects. (Kerkelä 2016). 
The freshwater waterways add some complexity with their canals, which are built to 
connect lakes with each other and the sea, and their locks, which enable ships to 
transport between lakes with differing elevations. The locks and canals include 
massive mechanical structures and concrete walls, which call for use and care on a 
daily basis (Kerkelä 2016), and require deep trenches during the construction phase. 
The technical uncertainties in waterway projects arise from the long distances, large 
vessels, and the water element, the combination giving rise to questions related to 
weather, safety, and environment. 
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The Finnish waterway network 
The waterways in Finland are classified on a scale of six classes according to their 
required service level, which again are based on the waterways’ importance to 
transportation. The waterway classes VL1 to VL2 regularly serve freight 
transportation, while classes VL3 to VL6 include shallower waterways, which serve 
economically less important transportation. The lengths of the waterways both at sea 
and in freshwater environments are described in the Table 1. The descriptions of the 
waterway classes can be found in Waterway classification in Finland.  
Of the 19 894 km of waterways in Finland (as in 2012), 16 254 km are governed by the 
FTA. The remaining 3 641 km are under private governance, of which 2 697 km are 
classified as VL6, the lowest service level waterways. These were delimited outside 
the scope of this work due to their different form of governance, although there 
appears to be no reason why the constructs would not work for VL6 waterway 
projects. (Liikennevirasto 2013). 
One feature of the waterway network in Finland is the annual freezing of all of the 
freshwater routes for several months. Depending on the winter, almost the whole 
Baltic Sea might freeze as well, which has happened five times during 1958–2008 
(Merenkulkulaitos 2008:27). 
Table 1:  The length (km) of public waterways per waterway class in Finland in 
2012. The FTA columns stand for waterways maintained by the FTA, 
while the “Other” columns stand for waterways maintained by others. 
Adapted from Liikennevirasto 2013. 
 
      Coastal       Freshwater       Total
FTA Other FTA Other FTA Other
VL1 2 172 km 111 km 0 km 0 km 2 172 km 111 km
VL2 1 023 km 81 km 757 km 8 km 1 780 km 89 km
VL1 ‐ VL2 3 195 km 192 km 757 km 8 km 3 952 km 200 km
VL3 2 642 km 84 km 2 071 km 7 km 4 713 km 91 km
VL4 892 km 68 km 284 km 3 km 1 176 km 71 km
VL5 876 km 565 km 3 077 km 17 km 3 953 km 582 km
VL6 643 km 932 km 1 817 km 1 765 km 2 460 km 2 697 km
VL3‐ VL6 5 058 km 1 652 km 7 245 km 1 778 km 12 302 km 3 441 km
Total
VL1 ‐ VL6
8 231 km 1 848 km 8 005 km 1 786 km 16 254 km 3 641 km
Waterway 
class
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2.4 Risk concepts 
The standard ISO 31000:2009 for risk management defines a number of terms related 
to risk. There are, however, other academically used definitions as well, and 
depending on the context, the definition of risk itself can vary substantially. This does 
not necessarily that mean all the interpretations are equal; there is no guarantee that 
the definition generally used for a given context is the best one for that very context. 
(Aven 2012). 
The following sections describe some risk concepts as they are found in the literature, 
and especially in the ISO 31000:2009, to provide the necessary background for 
interpreting the results of the study. 
A definition of RM Framework 
A risk management framework defines the approach of an organization for managing 
risk. ISO 31000:2009 defines a risk management framework as follows: 
Risk management framework – set of components that provide the 
foundations and organizational arrangements for designing, 
implementing, monitoring, reviewing and continually improving risk 
management throughout the organization. 
 NOTE 1 The foundations include the policy, objectives, mandate 
and commitment to manage risk. 
 NOTE 2 The organizational arrangements include plans, 
relationships, accountabilities, resources, processes and activities. 
 NOTE 3 The risk management framework is embedded within the 
organization's overall strategic and operational policies and 
practices. 
The success of risk management will depend on the effectiveness of the framework 
providing the foundations and arrangements that will embed it throughout the 
organization at all levels. The framework assists in managing risks effectively through 
the application of the risk management process at varying levels and within specific 
contexts of the organization. The framework ensures that information about risk 
derived from the risk management process is adequately reported and used as a basis 
for decision making and accountability at all relevant organizational levels. (ISO 
31000:2009). 
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Figure 4:  The process and principles of designing and maintaining a risk
  management framework, adapted from ISO 31000:2009.
Constant monitoring and continual development of a risk management framework are 
required in order to ensure that risk management is effective and continues to support 
organizational performance (ISO 31000:2009).
The definition of risk
The starting point of this work, when it came to the definition of risk, was the definition 
by the FTA (Liikennevirasto 2015), which treats risks as events with probability and 
consequence:  
Risk is defined as an unexpected negative or positive situation or event, which prevents 
or disturbs the realization of objectives, process or action, or provides new possibilities 
for achieving them. Risk has a magnitude, which is quantified based on the probability 
and the severity of consequences.
The origin of the FTA risk definition is the ISO 31000:2009. However, based on one 
of the authors of the FTA guideline (Liikennevirasto 2015), the definition of risk was 
altered to provide easier comprehensibility in the practical, project level.
In contrast, ISO 31000:2009 defines risk as follows:
Risk is the effect of uncertainty on objectives.
NOTE 1: An effect is a deviation from the expected – positive and/or negative.
NOTE 2: Objectives can have different aspects (such as financial, health and safety, and 
environmental goals) and can apply at different levels (such as strategic, organization-
wide, project and process).
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NOTE 3: Risk is often characterized by reference to potential events and consequences, 
or a combination of these. 
NOTE 4: Risk is often expressed in terms of combination of the consequences of an 
event (including changes in circumstances) and the associated likelihood of 
occurrence. 
NOTE5: Uncertainty is the state, even partial, of the deficiency of information related to, 
understanding or knowledge of an event, its consequence, or likelihood. 
While the definitions do resemble each other, there are also differences. The practical 
differences resulting from the changes to the ISO 31000:2009 risk definition should 
be considered. One noteworthy consequence of the differences is that uncertainty, 
being omitted in the FTA definition of risk, can more easily go unnoticed in the course 
of risk management. Rather, the closest match to “uncertainty” is the part 
“unexpected event or situation” in the FTA definition.  
Aven (2012:37) classifies risk definitions into nine categories. One category is the ISO 
31000:2009 definition. However, the FTA definition (Liikennevirasto 2015) appears to 
better fit the following category: “Risk = Probability and scenarios/Consequences/ 
severity of consequences”. Aven quotes four definitions fitting this category, of which 
the following one is in practice identical to the definition of the FTA: 
Risk is equal to the triplet (si, pi, ci), where si is the ith scenario, pi is the 
probability of that scenario, and ci is the consequence of the ith scenario, i 
= 1,2,…,N; i.e. risk captures: What can happen? How likely is that to 
happen? If it does happen, what are the consequences? (Kaplan et al. 
1981). 
Aven (2012:42) finds that the best possible definition for measuring risk is the 
combination of consequences and uncertainty (C & U). This differs from the definition 
of ISO 31000:2009, but only so little that Aven (2012) describes the ISO 31000:2009 
as a special case from the C & U definition.  
Uncertainty 
A risk assessment, as any predictive assessment, inherently contains uncertainties. 
The assessments are based on models describing the inherently uncertain world, be 
the model in the assessors mind or explicated as mathematical formulas. The 
question is not whether or not uncertainty is involved in an assessment, management 
strategy, or analysis, rather it is how much uncertainty is involved. The identification 
and characterization of the uncertainties and weaknesses related to the models, 
methods, and expertise used to assess and manage risk is imperative to the credibility 
of RM. (Modarres 2006:12). 
In some cases, a division can be made between epistemic (reducible) and aleatory 
(not practical to reduce) uncertainties (Modarres 2006:335). This might facilitate a 
better decision making process in RM.  
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Bias
Bias is defined by the Bloomsbury Reference Dictionary (1994) as “that which causes 
the mind to incline towards a particular object or course; inclination; bent; prejudice”. 
In the context of risk management, bias can be understood to cause the results of 
assessments to consistently differ from an “objective” or most likely value.
Bias can be unwilling and go unnoticed, or it can be a willing and very aware decision, 
such as when a civil engineer conservatively decides to double the thickness of a 
concrete beam to guarantee the strength of a structure, acknowledging that the actual 
strength of the structure is likely to be a lot bigger than the one stated to the customer.
L Low All of the following conditions are met
a) Data is not available, or is unreliable
b) The assertion is seen as unreasonable
c) There is lack of consensus among experts
d) The phenomena involved are not well understood;
     models are non-existing or are known/believed to give poor predictions
M Medium Conditions between those characterizing low and high
H High All of the following conditions are met
a) A lot of reliable data is available
b) The assertion is seen as very reasonable
c) There is broad agreement among experts
d) The phenomena involved are well understood;
     existing models are known to give good predictions
C Conservative The evidence is believed to lead to conservative characterizations 
compared to the unknown accurate level, i.e. an overestimation
N Neutral The evidence is believed to lead to value-neutral characterization
O Optimistic The evidence is believed to lead to optimistic characterizations compared 
to the unknown accurate level, i.e. an underestimation
L Low Model element has a significantly higher sensitivity than other elements
M Medium Model element has a sensitivity value in the middle range
H High Model element has a significantly lower sensitivity than other elements
Strength of evidence
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Figure 5:  An evidence assessment scheme for Bayesian Network risk analysis,
  adapted from Goerlandt & Montewka (2015:47).
There is a number of sources for bias in risk management, and as such their existence 
itself should not be problematic. The problem arises, when unacknowledged bias is 
linked to uncertainties about relatively large risks. The connection is depicted in Figure 
5, which describes an evidence assessment scheme for selecting alternative hypotheses. 
This was used by Montewka et al. (2015) to identify the riskiest of their evaluations.
Categorization of risks
The FTA (2016) divides risks into operational, process, and strategic risks, depending 
on the level of organization on which the risk affects. Using this division, all the risks in 
the FTA waterway projects fall into the category of operational risks.
However, from the perspective of the ERM contingency theory, Mikes & Kaplan (2014) 
divide risk into three categories: 
1. Preventable risk, which arises from routine operational breakdowns and
 undesired employee actions.
2. External risk, which the organization cannot influence itself, but only 
 prepare for. 
3. Strategy execution risk, which inherently follows from the business decisions
 to generate returns (or in the case of waterway projects, from the decision to
 provide transport network services).
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This division is mostly in accordance to Nocco & Stulz (2006:8–10). These categories 
appear to provide a good basis to determine the most suitable actions to control a risk.
Conducting a risk assessment
During a risk assessment the possible risks or hazards are first identified, then their 
mode of action and possible consequences are analysed, and last their significance 
is evaluated; whether they should be concerned about and taken action, or not. The 
process of a risk assessment according to ISO 31000:2009 is depicted in 
RISK ASSESSMENT
RISK IDENTIFICATION
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Figure 6:  RM process as described in ISO 31000:2009.
A variety of methods and approaches exist for each of the phases of a risk assessment. 
An encompassing analysis of commonly accepted risk assessment methods can be 
found in the standard ISO 31010:2009, along with their delimitations and strengths.
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A common differentiation is done between qualitative and quantitative risk analysis. 
A qualitative risk analysis accounts for the risk on scales with verbal values, without a 
clear and exact connection with any numerical or probabilistic values. A quantitative 
risk analysis, on the other hand, produces all the values on a numerical and 
probabilistic scale, resulting in a significantly more precise definition of the risks. A 
semi-quantitative approach can be found in between, where the probability and 
consequence are divided into categories, which are described with numerical values. 
For example, a risk analysis conducted with a risk matrix can be either qualitative or 
semi-quantitative, depending on the matrix and the procedure of the analysis. Figure 
7 depicts a risk matrix supporting a qualitative risk analysis. (ISO 31010:2010). 
According to ISO 31000:2009, the risk assessment process ends with risk evaluation, 
where the result of the risk analysis is compared with risk acceptability criteria, and 
the risks’ acceptability or intolerability is evaluated. 
Risk assessments play a significant role in risk management processes. The exact 
definition of a risk assessment varies depending on the applied standard, but for the 
use of this thesis the ISO 31000:2009 definition is used, as this is in accordance with 
Liikennevirasto (2015). 
To sum up, “Risk assessment provides decision-makers and responsible parties with 
an improved understanding of risks that could affect achievement of objectives, and 
the adequacy and effectiveness of controls already in place. … The output of a risk 
assessment is an input to the decision-making processes of the organization.” (ISO 
31010:2010). 
ISO 31000:2009 risk management process 
The risk management process model described in ISO 31000:2009, and used in 
Liikennevirasto 2015, comprises of the following parts: establishing the context, risk 
identification, risk analysis, risk evaluation, risk treatment, monitoring and review, 
and communication and consulting. The process flowchart is depicted in  
By establishing the context, the organization articulates its objectives, defines the 
external and internal parameters to be taken into account when managing risk, and 
sets the scope and risk criteria for the risk management process. Establishing the 
context is the process of answering e.g. the following questions: what are the 
constraints under which risk management is carried on; what is the environment and 
the regulations, internal and external to the organization at hand? What is the scope, 
strategies and parameters of the activities of the parts of the organisation where risk 
management is being applied? 
After establishing the context, and assessing the risks, the treatment of the risks is 
planned. Risk treatment is generally regarded to have four possible options when 
discussing negative risk: avoid, transfer, mitigate and accept. The corresponding 
actions for positive risks are to exploit, share, enhance and ignore (Hillson 2002:238–
239). The objective of the risk treatment is rarely to minimize the risk with negative 
consequences and to maximize the positive risk, as this would likely result in 
treatments with unreasonably high cost. Rather, the risk treatment decisions should 
usually aim for a level of risk which is a compromise between the cost of further risk 
treatment and the expected effect of the remaining risk. This level is often referred to 
as “As Low As Reasonably Practicable (ALARP)” (Modarres 2006). 
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The constantly ongoing RM processes include monitoring and review, and 
communication and evaluation. Monitoring and review ensures that the risk 
documents and plans are up-to-date and the treatments effective, while 
communication and consultation works to keep all relevant stakeholders and 
organization members acknowledged of the risks and their treatment. 
ISO 31000:2009: “Risk management can be applied to an entire organization, at its 
many areas and levels,  at  any  time,  as  well  as  to  specific  functions,  projects,  and  
activities.” Risk management principles are not dependent on the scope of risks, and 
guidelines may be presented  on  a  general  level  to  fit  “managing  any  form  of  risk  
in  a  systematic, transparent,  and  credible  manner,  and  within  any  scope  or  
context.” 
Another risk management process, especially designed for projects, is described in 
the PMBOK (PMI 2013), and discussed below. 
2.5 Project risk management 
PMBOK project risk management process 
PMI (2013:311) defines risks related to a project as project risks, thus making a 
division between the regular risks to an organization and project risks. PMI (2013:312) 
divides the project risk management process into six phases on a linear continuum, as 
described in Figure 8. 
At least the following relevant differences can be observed between the ISO 
31000:2009 and PMBOK (PMI 2013): 
1. The RM process is described as linear instead of cyclical. The temporary 
nature of projects has likely caused PMI (2013:312) to describe project risk 
management on a simple linear continuum instead of the cyclical, ever-
repeating process described in ISO 31000:2009. This does not mean, 
however, that the process would not be cyclical, as the Control Risks process 
includes the item Risk Reassessment. Yet the way this is depicted in PMBOK 
is clearly different from ISO 31000:2009. 
2. Risk analysis is specifically divided into a qualitative and quantitative part. 
3. Monitoring and review, and communication and consultation are replaced by 
a single process: Control Risks. 
The PMBOK (PMI 2013: 27–28; 313–318) describes the process of planning risk 
management in a project. It assumes that certain inputs are available from the 
organization when a project is started. From the viewpoint of risk, these include the 
following: 
1. Risk categories 
2. Common definitions of concepts and terms 
3. Risk statement formats 
4. Standard templates 
5. Roles and responsibilities 
6. Authority levels for decision making, and 
7. Lessons learned. 
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Figure 8:  The multi-organizational RM process, MORM, adapted from Lehtiranta 
(2014), along with the traditional PMBOK process. Note that Lehtiranta 
describes the MORM process to include multiple feedback loops, the 
longest line is from collective learning back to committing and selecting 
participants. 
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The PMBOK Guide (PMI 2013) uses the term “Control Risks” for the process of 
implementing risk response plans, tracking identified risks, monitoring residual risks, 
identifying new risks, and evaluating risk process effectiveness throughout the 
project. The Control Risks process is used to determine if: 
1. Project assumptions are still valid, 
2. Analysis shows an assessed risk has changed or can be retired, 
3. Risk management policies and procedures are being followed, and 
4. Contingency reserves for cost or schedule should be modified in alignment 
with the current risk assessment 
The PMI (2013:312) risk management process is further extended for use in multi-
organizational context by Lehtiranta (2014), which is discussed in the following 
section.  
A multi-organizational extension to project RM process  
Lehtiranta (2014) describes a risk management process for projects with several 
organizations (see Figure 8). The foundations of the process lie firstly on the project 
risk management process described in the PMBOK (PMI 2013), and secondly on 
complexity theory and its applications to project risk management. 
As the waterway projects run by the FTA always include more than one organization, 
the multi-organizational approach is noteworthy. Lehtiranta (2014) points out that the 
traditional project risk management theory is the most useful for simple project 
organizations, while the complexity-based project risk management theory has better 
applicability for complex project organizations. 
The MORM systematic presentation of parallel RM processes in multi-organization 
construction projects guides construction project managers more efficiently, setting 
up the RM process for their multi-organizational projects. A multi-level process chart 
enables participants to understand their roles more easily than in case-by-case 
project RM plans. MORM is designed to respond to the complexity of construction 
project risks by systematically increasing the opportunity for risk communication, 
response innovation, and flexible sharing of risk responsibility. (Lehtiranta 2014). 
However, the MORM process is not applicable to waterway projects as such, as it is 
designed to meet the needs of a PM consultant run building construction process. Yet 
the structure is not irrelevant, as the waterway project organizations may include 
similar sub-organizations as described in the MORM process. E.g. the one of the case 
projects includes two separate owners, a PM consultant, and the main contractor 
(MC). Still, the process needs to be specifically adapted to fit each project’s needs 
and organization. 
Furthermore, Lehtiranta (2014) strains that the use of MORM requires all focal 
participants to understand its principles, have appropriate access to the related tools 
and documents, and be committed to systematic risk management. 
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2.6 Waterway specific risk management 
approaches 
A number of detailed risk management procedures and guidelines have been 
developed by international organizations for the context of waterways. These include 
the Formal Safety Assessment (FSA) by the International Maritime Organization (IMO 
2002), a highly technical and complex risk assessment guideline, designed to provide 
a clear justification for proposed regulatory measures and to allow comparison of 
different options (IMO 2016). Another example is the Risk Management Guideline 
1018 by the International Association of Marine Aids to Navigation and Lighthouse 
Authorities (IALA 2013), which is intended as a general description on RM 
methodology for marine Aids to Navigation (AtoN). 
However, these guidelines are specifically applicable only to the planning phase of 
waterways or marine vessels, and therefore are of little to no use in the construction 
or maintenance phase of waterways, and do not bear additional value to the 
application compared to the ISO 31000:2009 and PMBOK (PMI 2013) guidelines. 
In addition to the RM approaches that are international by nature, a brief comparison 
was made concerning the waterway project risk management approaches in Sweden 
and Denmark. The project setting in these countries differs from the setting in 
Finland, and their relevance to the FTA waterway project RM framework development 
varies depending on the context. The available guidelines from Denmark 
(Transportministeriet 2010 and Soefartsstyrelsen 2013, 2016a, 2016b) focus on the 
financial and navigational RM of waterway project risks, and provide a basis for 
benchmarking risk management approaches during the whole timeline of single 
infrastructure projects. However, they leave the practical RM related to project 
management in construction and maintenance phase projects somewhat 
undiscussed. The available guideline from Sweden (Sjöfartsverket 2016), on the other 
hand, discusses the risk management process from the perspective of organizational 
objectives. While being on a very practical level, it provides only limited relevance to 
construction and maintenance phase projects. The understanding of the 
Sjöfartsverket’s approach to RM was complemented with several interviews, as 
discussed in Section 4.2. Summaries of the Danish and Swedish RM documents can 
be found in Summaries of waterway project RM guidelines in Sweden and Denmark. 
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3 Methodology
3.1 Research approach
The research falls into the domain of constructive research, which aims to solve practical 
problems while producing an academically acceptable theoretical contribution. 
Constructive research is pragmatic, and is interested on the instrumental value of 
knowledge in dealing with practical problems. The constructive research approach may 
be regarded as a form of case/field research, with the research result consisting of the 
construct itself, and of the practical and theoretical contribution of the work. (Kasanen 
et al. 1993:246, Lukka 2000, and Lehtiranta 2014:18–20).
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Figure 9:  The elements of constructive research, adopted from Kasanen et al.
  (1993:246).
The constructs developed during this work are managerial constructs; they deal with 
managing risk. Thus, the managerial construction research framework described by 
Kasanen et al. (1993) and Lukka (2000), and later used by Lehtiranta (2014) in the 
context of risk management in construction projects, was determined applicable to 
this research (see Figure 9). Kasanen et al. (1993:246) characterizes the approach by 
dividing it into the following six phases:
1. Find a practically relevant problem which also has research potential
2. Obtain a general and comprehensive understanding of the topic
3. Innovate, i.e., construct a solution idea
4. Demonstrate that the solution works
5. Show the theoretical connections and the research contribution of the 
 solution concept
6. Examine the scope of applicability of the solution
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Table 2:  The validation process of the developed constructs. Read from left to 
right. 
 
 
The duration of each of the case studies was approximately three hours, including an 
introduction, risk identification, and discussion, of which contents varied. The studies 
were succeeded by a crude risk analysis and structuring of a treatment plan by the 
author, which was later commented by the case study participants. The themes 
covered during each case study are described in Table 2. 
Construct validation parameters 
The validation of the constructs was based on two factors:  
1. The evaluation of the constructs in the frame of weak market testing. 
2. The enhancements in the projects’ RM plans, produced by the use of the 
constructs. 
Kasanen et al. (1993:253) describe the market-based validation process of managerial 
constructs. He argues that the testing of the pragmatic adequacy of a construct takes 
time and requires several attempts of application. The following market tests are 
based on the concept of innovation diffusion, i.e., managerial constructs are viewed 
as products competing in the market of solution ideas.  
1. Weak market test: Has any manager responsible for the financial results of his 
or her business unit been willing to apply the construct in question in his or 
her actual decision making?  
2. Semi-strong market test: Has the construct become widely adopted by 
companies?  
Validation process
I.
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II
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A
II
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 C
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gm
t g
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*
IV
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C
1. Waterway project RM process x x
2. Waterway hazard checklists
         - project management x x x
         - construction x x x
         - maintenance x x
3. Opportunity management x x x x
4. Enhanced  FTA RA process
         - consequence interval x x x
         - dual probabilities in matrix x x x
5. Model for establishing RM context x x x
* The construct validation part III. stands for the "FTA waterway condition 
management process development group"
36 
 
 
3. Strong market test: Have the business units applying the construct 
systematically produced better financial results than those which are not 
using it? 
An essential precondition to the application of market-based validation of managerial 
constructs is the existence of the market of managerial solution ideas (Kasanen et al. 
1993). The role of the FTA in the Finnish waterway projects ensures that the potential 
market of the constructs is mostly limited to government-run projects, inflicting that 
the true competition on the market of managerial solution ideas is perhaps more 
questionable than in companies operating in the market. Thus, the necessary but 
simplifying assumption was made, that the FTA project management have at least a 
collective ability to adapt to managerial circumstances and new ideas, which would 
entail the concepts of innovation diffusion and market testing to be valid in 
evaluating RM constructs for Finnish waterway projects. 
A weak market test was determined as approved, if two or more in an FTA waterway 
project organization found the construct useful or successful in their work, and the 
possible critique expressed by them or others during the validation process was 
insignificant in comparison (e.g., the critique concerned a minor detail that could be 
changed without compromising the functionality of the construct). 
The enhancements in the RM documentation consisted of risks that had previously 
not been recognized in the RM plans. In the Case C, these enhancements also 
included improved treatment options for previously identified risks. 
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Table 5:  RM perceptions of the eight Finnish interviewees. 
 
The FTA guideline defines “the essential tools of RM”, with which risks are being 
analysed in waterway maintenance projects (Liikennevirasto 2015). These include a 
combination of hazard checklists, a risk matrix, and risk management plans. However, 
the hazard checklists only exist for occupational health and safety risks, while 
checklists for the project management concerns of waterway projects are not 
available. These could include e.g. procurement risks, or the uncertainty on the 
precise quantities of material to be dredged during the project. 
The difference between the health and safety, and general routines for RM might be 
linked to the monitoring of the benefits of RM. The waterway industry, and the 
construction industry as a whole, has seen a significant decline in safety-related 
accidents during the last few decades, in which the systematic identification and 
minimizing of safety risks has no doubt played a remarkable role, along with the 
development of technology. The effect of a systematic approach to RM from an 
economic perspective RM was found more difficult to monitor and observe, which is 
likely to affect the attitudes towards economic RM. 
Some of the interviewees pointed out, that the contractor and the client/project have 
different responsibilities and thus perceive risks differently. They shared the opinion 
that the waterway planning phase risks are not managed properly. The latter could 
have an influence to both construction and maintenance phase RM. 
It is also noteworthy, that the system for providing risk information flow between the 
FTA projects was found unclear, and that while the principles of the flow were 
described in the FTA guideline, the practical application of the principles did not 
exist. 
Pl
an
ni
ng
 a
nd
 p
ro
je
ct
s (
3)
Ma
in
te
na
nc
e 
(5
)
Interview summary
Has positive experience of the "essential tools of RM"* x x
Identifies benefits in RM x x
RM includes more than just health and safety risks** x ½
Health and safety RM
RM is a regular routine x x
Benefits from RM have been monitored x x
RM is systematically a part of decision making x x
Project RM (without health and safety risks)
RM is a regular routine x 0
Benefits from RM have been monitored x 0
RM is systematically a part of decision making x ½
* Incl. hazard checklists, RM plans and risk matrices
**Health, safety and environmental risks are monitored regularly in site meetings in both 
maintenance and construction projects.
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The ISO 31004:2013 stresses that especially the subclauses 4.3.2 to 4.3.7 of the ISO 
31000:2009 should be evaluated against the framework. These describe the design of 
a RM framework regarding policy, accountability, integration into organizational 
processes, resources, and establishing internal and external communication and 
reporting mechanisms.  
Table 7:  The building blocks of the FTA waterway project RM framework. 
 
RM policy 
The FTA risk management policy is described on a general level in Liikennevirasto 
(2016d), and infrastructure project specifically in Liikennevirasto (2015). These 
appear to be in line and support each other, together describing a clear and 
conformable policy, which reflects the principles of RM as described in ISO 
31000:2009. 
Accountability 
The accountability and authority for managing risks in waterway projects is expected 
to usually be clear, as each of the projects is appointed a project manager. Their 
competence in RM is outside the reach of this evaluation, although the survey 
discussed in Section 4.1 does indicate they have due experience in RM.  
It might prove worthwhile to establish a process for project management RM 
competence development, if such does not exist in the FTA. 
 
The building blocks of 
the FTA waterway project RM 
framework
(ISO 31000:2009)
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Foundations
policy x x
objectives x x
mandate x
commitment x x
Organizational arrangements
plans x x
relationships x x
accountabilities x x
resources x x x x x x x x x
processes x
activities x x
1.      FTA RM Principles (Liikennevirasto 2016d)
2.      FTA RM Protocol for transport infrastructure projects (Liikennevirasto 2015)
3.      Safety risk management procedure for infrastructure projects (Liikennevirasto 2012)
4.      RM in railway planning (Liikennevirasto 2010)
5.      Risks in road care service agreements (Tiehallinto 2009)
6.      The FTA process management system
7.      Safety and RM register (TURI)
8.      Internal tender and project management guidelines and contract forms
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Integration into organizational processes 
The integration of RM into organizational processes is deductible through 
observation of the FTA process management system and the tender and project 
management guidelines. While it should be acknowledged that the process 
management system was under development during the writing of this thesis, it also 
noteworthy that it did not include RM as internal to the described processes from the 
project management perspective.  
Instead, RM was described solely as a safety and health task, which is included as a 
part of the tendering process and work site meetings. Likewise, RM is included only as 
a safety and health related part of the tender process in the tender and project 
management guidelines. 
Resources 
Table 8:  Evaluation of the adequacy of RM resources in the practice of waterway 
projects, as described in ISO 31000:2009. 
 
The ISO 31000:2009 stresses the importance of appropriate RM resources in six 
categories. Their evaluation against the FTA waterway PM framework is discussed in 
Table 8, where the left column lists the risk management resources as defined by the 
ISO 31000:2009, and on the right a subjective evaluation of the resources in practice. 
RM resource category Av
ai
la
bi
lit
y
Explanation
People, skills, experience 
and competence ½
The people and their experience levels are shortly assessed in 
Section 4.1 - however, the assessment of their skills and 
competence is not possible based on the available 
information. Note: see category below.
Resources needed for each 
step of the risk management 
process
½
A clear understanding of the sufficiency of resources for RM 
was not provided by the sources. However, one open 
comment by a FTA survey respondent noted the following: 
"Although the availability of benefits (through RM) is obvious, 
RM is often left disregarded due to the scarcity of resources." 
(Based on the survey described in Section 4.1). While the 
value of the comment is anecdotal, it does provide a due 
reason for the investigation of the subject.
The organization’s 
processes, methods and 
tools to be used for 
managing risk
0
The RM process, methods and tools are publicly available for 
use. From waterway project RM perspective, the available 
hazard checklists do not include waterway-specific hazards. 
Instead risk identification is instructed to be conducted 
through the adaptation of other, somewhat applicable 
checklists.
While this may in some circumstances be a valid approach, it 
requires expert knowledge, and would be more 
straightforward with especially designed hazard checklists.
Documented processes and 
procedures
½
The documentation of the RM process is on a superficial level 
when compared to the ISO 31000:2009 standard. The 
documentation focuses on risk identification and 
communication, leaving establishing the context, risk analysis, 
risk evaluation, and monitoring in practice undiscussed.
Information and knowledge 
management systems
½
The safety and RM register (TURI) was under implementation 
during the writing of this thesis. Waterway project risks were 
bound to be included in the system in the future. See 
Appendix 5: Summaries of the FTA RM framework documents 
and systems.
Training programmes ? Information of RM training programmes for the FTA project 
management was not availble for this research.
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Risk identification 
Risks in FTA waterway projects are identified with the help of varying hazard 
checklists. These are divided in Liikennevirasto (2015) into groups, which should be 
considered according to project phase and type. 
From waterway project RM perspective, the available hazard checklists do not include 
waterway-specific checklists except for care service agreement projects – instead, risk 
identification is instructed to be conducted through adaption of other checklists. 
While this may in some circumstances be a valid method, it requires more expert 
knowledge and time than with especially designed hazard checklists. 
ISO 31010:2010 lists the following strengths (+) and limitations (–) in the use of 
checklists as a tool for the risk identification process: 
 they may be used by non-experts 
 when well designed, they combine wide ranging expertise into an easy to use 
system 
 they can help ensure common problems are not forgotten 
 
 they tend to inhibit imagination in the identification of risks 
 they address the ‘known known’s’, not the ‘known unknown’s’ or the ‘unknown 
unknown’s’ 
 they encourage ‘tick the box’ type behaviour 
 they tend to be observation base, so miss problems that are not readily seen 
 
To counter the limitations of the check-list approach, ISO 31010:2010 recommends 
pairing of the checklists with a more imaginative technique that identifies new 
problems, with the imaginative technique preferably applied first. This imaginative 
technique could, e.g., be brainstorming of a kind, when applied in an expert workshop. 
Risk analysis  
Risks are analyzed in the FTA waterway projects with the help of a risk matrix on a 
semi-quantitative scale. 
ISO 31010:2010 lists the following strengths (+) and limitations (–) in the use of risk 
matrices (or consequence/probability matrices) as a tool for risk analysis: 
 relatively easy to use 
 provides a rapid ranking of risks into different significance levels 
 
 a matrix should be designed to be appropriate for the circumstances so it may 
be difficult to have a common system applying across a range of 
circumstances relevant to an organization 
 it is difficult to define the scales unambiguously 
 use is very subjective and there tends to be significant variation between 
raters 
 risks cannot be aggregated (i.e. one cannot define that a particular number of 
low risks or a low risk identified a particular number of times is equivalent to 
a medium risk) 
 it is difficult to combine or compare the level of risk for different categories of 
consequences  
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Results will depend on the level of detail of the analysis, i.e. the more detailed the 
analysis, the higher the number of scenarios, each with a lower probability. This will 
underestimate the actual level of risk. The way in which scenarios are grouped 
together in describing risk should be consistent and defined at the start of the study. 
(ISO 31010:2010). 
However, the FTA guidelines do not provide much advice on how to use the matrix 
and thus acknowledge its limitations and shortcomings, fully exposing the risk 
management process to those limitations. Additionally, these drawbacks somewhat 
undermine the RM policy requirement for always comparing the risk and its treatment 
on a uniform scale, for how could this be possible, if the matrix’s use and 
interpretation is very subjective? (Liikennevirasto 2016d) 
The risk matrix is used in the FSA process as well, but its use is delimited to an initial 
screening of the risks, which is a part of risk identification, not analysis (IMO 
2016:10).  
For the last, it should be noted, that risk is defined here to include uncertainty relating 
to events with positive consequences. Equally, risk analysis (and assessment) should 
be focused to both negative and positive consequences, if consistency with the 
definitions is to be maintained. This should be reflected in the tools for risk analysis, 
if the positive consequences are to be identified and sought after through the process 
of RM.  
Risk evaluation 
Risk evaluation is conducted simultaneously with the risk analysis, as the risk rating 
achieved from the risk matrix corresponds to a policy on risk treatment. Thus, risk 
evaluation does not exist as a separate phase of risk assessment. 
Risk treatment 
The current risk management forms do not require analyzing the efficacy or efficiency 
of the chosen risk treatment. Instead, the treatment of single risks, is, at least 
sometimes, decided upon simultaneously with the analysis of the risk, without the 
truly questioning the treatment’s capability of reducing risk (based on a statement by 
one of the interviewees). 
With the implementation of the risk and safety register in FTA projects, analyzing the 
effect of the treatment becomes compulsory. This has the possibility to improve the 
level of risk management, but only if the analysis of the treatment is given due 
attention. 
Yet even the analysis of the effect of risk treatment does not remove the problems of 
risk matrices; their tendency to produce subjective results. Without dealing with the 
problem of subjectivity of the risk analysis both pre- and post-treatment, it is 
impossible for the risk manager to stand behind the claim of the treatment’s 
capability of reducing the risk a given amount. 
Monitoring and review 
Clear process descriptions on the monitoring of project management risks do not 
exist for the knowledge of the author. The realization of the project-internal 
monitoring process is in practice likely to vary between projects.  
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maintenance projects; the maintenance project process descriptions includes a 
three-category classification of the significance & RM approach combinations for 
the maintenance projects. This stems from the great variability between different 
maintenance projects, which cannot be easily described with a single process. A similar 
classification is in use by the California Department of Transportation (Caltrans 2012).
The value of the construct is that it describes how the risk management process should 
be conducted in the course of projects on a general level. No explicit descriptions of 
these processes were previously available in the FTA. While the constructs are not likely 
to represent the best possible RM processes, it provides an initial level of descriptions, 
which could be eligible for their implementation in practice. Ideally, their functionality 
would be monitored in the course of future projects, and they would facilitate continuous 
development by describing “best practice” approaches at the FTA.
However, to fulfil the corresponding principle of the ISO 31000:2009, the processes 
should eventually be integrated as parts of the FTA process management system and 
the FTA tender guidelines.
CONSTRUCTION
PROJECT PLANNING TENDER PROCESS CONSTRUCTION AND
IMPLEMENTATION
PROJECT FINISH
CONSTRUCTION PHASE
Construction launch
RA
Final meeting
Leftover / 
maintenance
phase risks
Owner’s risks
Contractor’s
risks
Stakeholder
risks
RM review
2-4 per 
year
RM planning required 
by the tender process
Project launch RA
Owner’s risks
Allocation of 
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service 
provider 
through
tender
process
Contractor’s
risks
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R
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Stakeholder
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Figure 11:  The RM process tied to the lifetime of a construction project.
MAINTENANCE / USE AND CARE: 
SERVICE AGREEMENTS
TENDER PLANNING TENDER PROCESS AGREEMENT PERIOD FINISH
CARE SERVICE AGREEMENTS
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launch RA
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maintenance
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RM review
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Figure 12:  The RM process tied to the lifetime of a care service agreement project.
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The process descriptions mostly follow the same structure: first, the risk assessments 
are conducted before the tendering process. The risk management plan is updated 
during the construction or project execution, and in the end of the project the 
successfulness of the risk management is evaluated and the remaining risk defined. 
The process descriptions have been adapted to fit the properties of each project type 
and corresponding terminology.
The process description figures proceed from the left to the right. The green shapes 
represent risk assessment, blue shapes the risks inflicted to the project, which have 
been identified, assessed, and described in the risk management plan. The grey shapes 
represent other risk management activities, such as the allocation of project risk to the 
service provider through the tender process.
PROJECT PLANNING LAUNCH PROJECT
PERIOD
FINISH
UPKEEP PROJECTS
Project RA Final meeting
Maintenance
risks
Owner’s risks
Contractor’s
risks
Stakeholder
risks
Project planning RA
Owner’s risks
Stakeholder
risks
RM follow-up, 
process
development, 
update
coordination
and risk
updates
MAINTENANCE / UPKEEP
UPKEEP RISK MANAGEMENT
The upkeep projects are very variable in terms of time, scale and other attributes. It 
is relevant for the RM approach and the project features to be in line with each 
other.
The risk management methods are preliminarily divided into three groups below
based on the size of project:
• SMALL: RM can be dealt with through e-mail or phone in projects worth less than
100 000 € or with duration of less than 1 month
• MEDIUM: Projects worth less than 500 000 € should include RM methodology as 
parts of construction site and other meetings
• LARGE: Projects worth more than 500 000 € should manage risks in full-scale RM 
meetings (e.g. before construction site meeteings)
The RM approach should always be in accordance with the project demandingness, 
uniqueness and circumstances. The project-specific risks should always be identified. 
Especially in small projects, involving repetitive and well forecastable jobs, the RA 
can be done using only system description. In this case the project is divided into 
single jobs and work phases, and each is pursued for risks, or factors causing 
uncertainty.
The risks should be written down in small projects as well – shortly but 
unambiguously, e.g. using the first three columns of the risk management form. If a 
risk clearly surpasses the risk appetite before its dedicated treatment, all the 
columns should be filled for that risk.
In large projects the RM methodology approaches the methodology of a construction 
project, which are described above.
When a project is terminated, a short feedback form should be sent to the contractor 
about the RM procedures in the project. This can be a part of a larger feedback 
survey.
T
E
N
D
E
R
 D
E
C
IS
IO
N
Figure 13:  The RM process tied to the lifetime of an upkeep project.
The complete descriptions or legends for the processes can be found in the The 
constructs.
Construct validation results
The project RM process was commented and developed by two groups of experts in the 
FTA: by the participants of an expert workshop arranged for this purpose only, and by 
a process development group responsible for waterway management in the FTA. The 
construct was presented as such, without commenting on the future form or use of the 
constructs.  
The response from the first expert group was uniformly positive, although some details 
in the processes required further development. 
The latter meeting was not participated by the author of this work, and the “silent 
approval” transmitted as second-hand information may represent a biased piece of 
information. Additionally, the group is only responsible for waterway maintenance, and 
thus one of the three described processes in the construct was outside the group’s 
interests.
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Table 9:  The number of identified risks in each of the case studies through the use 
of hazard checklists.  
 
 
The precise effect of combining brainstorming with the use of checklists was not 
analyzed after the case studies. However, it was perceived as a good addition to the 
checklists by some of the participants, and did in every case study collaborate with at 
least one risk that would have otherwise been left unidentified. 
The project management checklist was tested only in the Case A, and having been 
previously (before minor modifications) in use in road and rail projects in Finland, its 
general usefulness well established, and the testing of the checklist was not as 
profound as with the other lists. The checklist redeemed comments such as “this 
should have been taken into consideration way before in this project”, which speaks 
for the usefulness of the checklist. The checklist was also requested by the Case C 
project management, narrating a demand for the list. 
The construction hazard checklist was tested first in the Case A project, and then in 
the Case C project, in which the waterway played a significantly smaller role. This was 
also reflected in the numbers of new identified risks (see Table 9). However, as the 
Case C project was only approaching the tendering phase, some of the identified risks 
caused immediate need for action, and even if only to ensure that certain details exist 
as expected, the practical collaboration of the hazard checklist was evident. 
The maintenance checklist, on the other hand, did not appear to serve its purpose as 
well as the other checklists. Instead of facilitating conversation about the risks, it 
ended up facilitating the adjustment of the very checklist to more closely comply with 
the FTA hierarchy of waterway maintenance terminology. As a consequence, all the 
risks identified were a result of the brainstorming technique, and the checklist was 
developed after the case study.  
The cause for the low result of identified risks using the maintenance checklist allows 
several hypotheses, which could true simultaneously or separately. Firstly, the 
checklist might have indeed been so faulty, that it drove the concentration away from 
the project in question. Secondly, the result might have been affected by unsuccessful 
facilitation and preparation of the participants. Thirdly, the contractor and the FTA 
project management had a long history in the industry, and thus had learned to 
Number of identified 
risks through the 
use of the hazard 
checklists
Ca
se
 A
Ca
se
 B
Ca
se
 C
Project management 11+4 n/a n/a
Construction 11+5 n/a 6*
Maintenance n/a (12+4) n/a
Previously identified 21 n/a 12**
**Includes only the risks concerning the waterway 
part of the project
*Additionally, five health and safety risks were 
updated.
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The second part of the construct was a controversial, additional scale of probabilities 
in the risk matrix, in a way that in did not even closely match the original probability 
scale. Its primary purpose was to produce a comparison point for the original 
probability scale and to produce discussion about the probabilities of the risks. 
The risk matrix can be found due to its size in the The constructs. 
Construct validation results 
The testing of this construct was perhaps the most controversial part of the validation 
process, and the testing process brought up results that were not expected prior to 
the case studies. 
The use of currency-scale interval for the possible risk consequences was discussed 
and, in part, tested in one of the cases. Initially, it was commented that it would not be 
possible to determine any interval for the consequences, but when given a rough 
proposal for the interval, the adjustment of the numbers towards a reasonable 
estimation was suddenly found possible.  
However, the client organization appeared reluctant to discuss the exact numbers 
concerning the possible consequences of the risks. When stressed, they commented 
that the discussion of the numbers might prove useful, but this should be done 
internally to the client organization, without any external service providers – 
indicating that the information were too sensitive for the ears of others – while risk 
information based on the analysis with risk matrix were not. 
The client organization representatives of another case, on the other hand, approved 
the idea of analyzing risk consequences with intervals, with a statement claiming that 
all additional information is useful. 
The second part of the construct, the inclusion of non-matching percent values on the 
probability scale of the risk matrix, was tested in each of the case studies, after being 
deemed reasonable for testing in the expert workshop.  
The inclusion in the matrix was typically acknowledged by the case study participants 
with a single remark, but no other comment was expressed during or after the case 
studies, or when commenting the results. Thus, no effect was detected to have been 
caused by the enhancement. This consequently indicates that the actual values on the 
probability axis of the matrix play no significant role in the risk analysis process using 
a risk matrix. This controversy provides reasonable doubt that the use of the risk 
matrix would generate results with practical usefulness – or that the potential for 
making accurate conclusions about the ALARP level of the risk based on the matrix 
analysis alone were possible.  
Rather, it appeared that the use of the risk matrix was based more on the risk classes 
than the probability-consequence scale. This was reflected during and after the case 
studies in comments such as “We think this risk should be level 3 instead of level 2”, 
or “We can’t give a level 5 to it. They’d look at us badly in the RM department, without 
understanding the true nature of the risk.”  
59
Should this hypothesis about the low level of information of the matrix-evaluated 
scores be true, it would contradict with the FTA RM Principles (Liikennevirasto 2016d), 
which requires the risks and their treatments to be analysed in a way that allows direct 
comparison of the RM resources and the corresponding gains. While it should be noted, 
that one cannot definitely declare how this observation would affect the project results 
compared to a more specific analysis method, it appears clear, that the expertise and 
the experience of the service providers and other stakeholders cannot be utilised in full 
extent in the RM process or risk-related decision making when only using a risk matrix 
in the risk analysis.
4.4.5 Model for establishing a project’s RM process context
Construct description
A simple visual tool, a model or a form, was created to provide a simple way for 
establishing the context of a RM process. Its idea is to depict the different aspects to be 
covered by the RM process, and it should be prepared for each RM process individually. 
CASE C: BRIDGE REPLACEMENT
RM PROCESS CONTEXT
OBJECTIVE:
PROJECT EXECUTION SAFELY, 
EFFICIENTLY AND 
ENVIRONMENTALLY FRIENDLY
BRIDGE
CONSTRUC-
TION
WATERWAY
RELOCATION
DREDGING
AND LANDFILL
TEMPORARY
NAVIGATION
MARK
CHANGES
NEW BRIDGE, 
TEMPORARY
EMBANKMENTS
RAFT-BASED
WORK
PERMANENT
NAVIGATION
MARK
CHANGES
TRAFFIC
COORDI-
NATION
TRAFFIC
MANAGEMENT
AND PILOTAGE
WATERWAY
MAINTENANCE
AUXILIARY
ACTIVITIES
PROJ. MGMT, 
SUPERVISION
AND
PROCESSES
INFORMATION
FLOW AND 
COMMUNI-
CATION
QUALITY
ASSURANCE
STORAGE AND 
HARBOR 
ACTIVITIES
PLANS AND 
DATA MODELS
SWING
BRIDGE AND 
DEMOLISHING
PERMITSRESCUE
SERVICES MULTIBEAM
SURVEYS
PASSAGE
HEIGHT AND 
WIDTH RES-
TRICTIONS
Figure 14:  An example of the model for establishing a project’s RM process context.
Establishing the context is described as the first part of the FTA and ISO 31000:2009 
RM process. However, it should be noted, that the construct does not cover the whole 
“establishing the context of the RM process”, as described by the ISO 31000:2009, but 
rather focuses on describing the project objectives. Of course, the construct can be 
used in various ways depending on the project and risk management approach, but its 
value is in its ability to present project variables in an easy and visual manner.
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The management of opportunities as a part of the RM process was a well-received 
construct. Although the quality of the identified opportunities in the case studies per 
se is questionable, the potential of switching the project management’s mind-set 
towards the positive weighs on the other end of the scale. This would reflect the 
comment of the FTA’s Swedish counterpart about “getting to the offensive side” of 
RM.  
The results and reception concerning the modified FTA RA process were less 
impressive, implying that more research and development work is needed for the 
application of the construct in practice. 
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5 Discussion 
5.1 The problem of determining the correct 
path for RM 
The success or failure of a RM approach in either enterprise or project context – or 
both – is a result of a complex interplay of factors relating to an activity. Therefore, 
one cannot make definite conclusions about the successfulness of an approach in an 
activity based on the experiences from another activity. The same problem applies to 
“best practices” of RM, and to the constructs developed during this research – they do 
not necessarily work in other contexts than which prevailed during the initial 
experiments.  
However, from this follows that the approach which was initially applied to a context 
is rarely the best one in the next context. This could firstly mean that the 
experimenting with different methodologies in different contexts should be a 
constantly ongoing process. Secondly, this could mean that instead of describing a 
“best practice” approach, a toolbox containing a variety of RM approaches and their 
success in varying contexts might be more useful. 
The creation of such toolbox at the FTA would, of course, inflict its own demands – at 
least two of which require changes in the current project practice: first, the monitoring 
and measurement of different levels of RM processes and their successfulness should 
be enhanced, possibly according to the guidance of ISO 31000:2009. The practice-
based definition for ERM by Mikes & Kaplan (2014:14) points towards the same 
direction with their requirement of [successful] ERM consisting of “active and 
intrusive processes … capable of challenging existing assumptions”. Second, the RM 
sub-process of establishing the context should be brought to a level, which allows for 
the other project risk managers to use that information for choosing their approach. 
Without the information provided by such a toolbox, the use and development of 
project RM approaches inside the FTA can only be based on intuition and heurestics 
about the practice and on incomprehensive information from single case studies.  
This is partly what was done during the course of this research. The next three 
sections below describe some hunches along with reasoning on potential 
development directions for the waterway project RM at the FTA. 
5.2 Towards the management of uncertainty 
The construct introducing the management of opportunities in addition to threats 
provides one step towards the management of risk as it is defined in ISO 31000:2009: 
“the effect of uncertainty on objectives”. However, the use of the construct does not 
quite reach the target of managing uncertainty, but rather dodges the question. 
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Atkinson et al. (2006) argue that even though RM of both threats and opportunities 
produces better results than only focusing on the negative, the approach still falls 
short: “It does not facilitate consideration of aspects of variability that are driven by 
underlying ambiguity and lack of information.” Effective uncertainty management 
needs to address uncertainty in a broad sense, with the consideration of all sources of 
significant uncertainty and associated responses, such as the lack of information, 
ambiguity, characteristics of project parties, trade-offs between trust and control 
mechanisms, and varying agendas in different stages of the project life cycle. 
A more explicit focus on uncertainty management is required. This can be facilitated 
by paying attention to the involved parties and their respective objectives in three 
ways (Atkinson et al. 2006): 
1. Treat the definition of objectives as a key part of managing projects 
2. Project management should clarify and manage desired trade-offs between 
multiple performance objectives 
3. Ownership of uncertainty requires specific consolidation – decisions need to 
be made about how uncertainty and associated issues should be allocated to 
the different parties, recognising that different parties have different 
objectives, perceptions of project risk and different capabilities for managing 
associated sources of uncertainty. 
However, in order to switch the focus onto the uncertainties instead of the threats one 
must account for the method of their measurement, or risk analysis. Although in some 
cases the matrices might provide a good medium of measurement, a more intuitive 
way could be found from the use of intervals, or probability distributions (see e.g. 
Modarres 2006), which make it possible to describe the inherently probabilistic 
information in an unambiguous way. For example, using a risk matrix to analyse a risk 
with both positive and negative consequences would require choosing a value from 
both the negative and the positive axis, leading to a very unintuitive description of the 
risk. 
Nevertheless, the use of risk matrices is very established in the FTA, and if this 
approach for risk analysis were truly dysfunctional, it would likely have been 
substituted with a better solution already during its implementation process. This 
could be explained by the historical development of RM in Finland, where it was first 
implemented during the 1980’s and 1990’s in safety, environmental, and quality 
contexts (Räikkönen 2002:13–20); it is notably more difficult, or less intuitive to 
identify risks with positive safety or environmental consequences, and thus 
generating adequate methods and tools for their management can be considered 
significantly less fruitful. One could imagine that after the risk matrices were found 
useful in their initial context, they were simply migrated into the use of more general 
project RM without diligent checking for compliance, the result of which is the 
concurrent FTA project RM approach. 
The prevailing ambiguity of risk information in the Finnish project RM could also be 
explained through effectivity and efficiency. Lehtiranta (2014) describes similar 
phenomena regarding the uninformativeness of risk information as discussed in 
Section 4.4.4: Modified FTA risk analysis process in her case study about the project 
RM in a complex Finnish construction project: “The activities involved in the 
identification and analysis of risk are in practice intertwined. Risk analysis in the case 
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projects is often intuitive, and the main assessment is simply made between the 
qualitative categories, ‘significant’ and ‘insignificant’. … The identified [RM] processes 
seem to be more based on heuristics and intuition than on calculative analytics”. She 
seems to suggest this could be at least partly a result from the pursuit for effectivity 
and efficiency in the construction phase of projects, in which case the relative lack of 
information could be a by-product of using a two-dimensional matrix for describing 
information which by nature would be well represented by the two categories: 
significant and insignificant. 
In either way, or even if neither were true, a conscious decision should be made about 
the level of information which should be pursued by the risk analyses in the FTA 
waterway projects. In making this decision it should be acknowledged that one 
problem with relying on heuristics and intuition is that they only serve well in 
environments in where the decision maker has had the ability to learn and adapt their 
mental models from previous projects or phenomena in an environment which is 
sufficiently regular to be predictable (Kahnemann 2011:234–244). 
5.3 Mutual trust and the contracting model 
Atkinson et al. (2006) underline the importance and development of mutual trust in 
well-performing projects, especially when the project contains significant 
uncertainties. This was equally stressed by an interviewee from Sjöfartsverket, who 
described their “best practice” of a multi-day kick-off workshop in the beginning of 
each project, where project objectives and risks are discussed between the 
participants, and mutual trust is developed. “Usually 80–90 % of the [stakeholder] 
objectives are, in fact, the same”, helping to provide a solid surface for mutual trust 
without changing the contract.   
Yet there are projects, where the participant objectives simply are not the same, and 
the development of mutual trust and open discussion of uncertainties inevitably 
results in one or more of the stakeholders abusing that trust to their own benefit. 
According to the Sjöfartsverket interviewee, in these cases an open RM process is not 
the correct tool for project success. Instead, the interviewee had personally seen the 
positive change brought by [public-private] partnering contracts, which, if used 
correctly, aligns the stakeholders’ goals and enables a good working environment for 
RM. 
The validation results indicated a restraint of the communication of quantified risk 
information between the parties of a project. This hindered the risk analysis by firstly 
removing the contractor’s experts from contributing to the project RM from their 
perspective, and secondly, in the case example, also implied that the use of the more 
precise risk analysis methods was not applied in the risk analysis. Whether this in fact 
was affected by lack of mutual trust is unclear, but the hypothesis should not be 
disregarded either. 
A possible redemption would be to create and nurture a climate of mutual trust 
among the project participants. Also, following the example of Sweden into the use of 
partnering contracts is a noteworthy possibility. 
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5.4 The next steps for FTA 
The current FTA waterway project RM framework is in practice a one-size-fits-all 
approach for safety and health risks, falling short from the standard it refers to in a 
number of ways. Although, under the contingency theory, it is not evident that the ISO 
31000:2009 standard would provide the best possible framework for waterway project 
RM, nothing was found to point toward the standard not being adequate in this 
context.  
Instead, the author recommends the FTA to continue with the implementation 
process of the standard (assessed in Section 4.3), while respecting the complexity 
and needs of single waterway projects. For the use of the constructs, the first steps 
could be to apply the developed hazard checklists into practice, and to include and 
develop the project RM processes as integral parts of waterway project process 
descriptions and tender guidelines. The subsequent step could be to tilt the RM plane 
toward the management of uncertainty instead of focusing on threats and 
opportunities alone, and to establish a project start workshop practice along the 
footsteps of the Swedish (see Sections 5.2 and 5.3). 
During the course of this research, one development idea surfaced continuously: the 
RM in the planning phase of waterway projects is inferior if not completely lacks 
existence. To provide a reliable basis for decision making in projects, and a natural 
flow of risk information from planning to the construction phase, the RM processes 
and approaches in the waterway planning phase need to be developed. The ISO 
31000:2009 standard could provide a good starting point for the work, while e.g. the 
project RM manual of California Department of Transportation (2012; and Maria-
Sanchez 2012) might enable adequate benchmarking. 
Another idea worth considering would be to create a “common body of knowledge” 
containing the RM tools, approaches and structures that can be used in varying 
applications and projects throughout the FTA. A wiki-like structure could enable the 
managers and project managers to rate and comment the different practices based on 
their experiences, and describe the RM approaches they perceive to be most 
adequate. 
5.5 The reliability and applicability of the 
results 
The reliability of the results varies between the different parts of the thesis. Some 
conclusions are backed up by the survey, the interviews, the RM framework analysis 
and the validation process of the constructs. These represent a very reliable level of 
information. In the other end of the scale of reliability lie the subjective 
interpretations made by the author based on the single case studies. 
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Especially the results of the FTA waterway RM practice evaluation in Section 4.3 
represent a fairly subjective and shallow understanding. Thus, instead of seeing the 
results as an absolute statement, the value of the evaluation is the evaluation results 
and their ability to provide development possibilities leading to successful 
constructs. 
Special consideration should be applied to the reliability of the validation process 
results. The sample of the study was relatively small, and although it represented 
some of the largest waterway projects being conducted during the work, the majority 
of different projects and project types were left outside the case studies. Thus, even if 
the constructs worked in the given environment, they might severely lack 
functionality in another. 
The validation of constructs through market testing included the simplifying 
assumption that the FTA project management have a collective ability to adapt to 
managerial circumstances and new ideas. However, this is not necessarily true. The 
FTA as a public service provider does not compete on the market, and thus the 
existence of forces inflicting positive change in the efficiency and efficacy of the 
management practices is not self-evident, but rather a question of government 
policies and political willpower. 
But perhaps the most significant factor affecting the result reliability is the author’s 
biases and perceptions. The share of the author’s participation and subjective 
interpretation throughout the validation reporting is notable, and neither objective-
ness nor the lack of biases can fully be guaranteed. 
The applicability of the constructs outside of the Finnish public sector waterway 
projects is limited, although possible. There is no good reason to expect construct 
functionality outside their proper context; only through understanding the constructs’ 
initial environment should the constructs be adopted. However, at least some of the 
results should be applicable to the other types of waterway projects run by the FTA. 
These projects are conducted using partly the same guidelines and other RM 
framework items in a similar cultural and legislative environment as the studied 
waterway projects. 
5.6 Theoretical connections and contribution 
The conducted research has its roots in the contingency theory of ERM. The results 
suggest that the ISO 31004:2013 could provide an adequate basis for the analysis of 
the “ERM mix” in those organizations, which have implemented or are guided by the 
ISO 31000:2009 standard for RM. 
This work describes one ERM mix combined with a group of contingent variables. As it 
will require a significant amount of additional data to determine the best variables for 
forecasting the successfulness of a RM approach, it cannot be known for certain 
whether this research contains all of them or not. To counter this effect, this analysis 
made in this thesis tries to capture a variety of factors affecting and describing the 
RM process. 
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The validation results of the developed constructs indicate that hazard checklists 
combined with brainstorming approach provides a functioning tool for the risk 
identification in waterway development projects in the Finnish waterway projects. The 
rest of the validation results provide less coherent information on the performance of 
the available and developed RM tools and approaches. The practical functionality of 
the other constructs should be observed over longer periods of time. 
The results described in this thesis could be utilised in the development of a 
“common body of knowledge”, as described by Mikes & Kaplan (2014).  
5.7 Recommendations for further research 
The development of a common body of knowledge consistent with the contingency 
theory would provide significant help to practitioners worldwide. As the practices for 
disclosing corporate risk information vary, and often reflect the most ambiguous and 
non-comparable information possible, the risk information available from the 
corporate sector is minimal (Hookana-Turunen 2000). Thus, the public sector could 
play a significant role as the source of the information for the development of an 
established body of ERM risk knowledge – which could be especially beneficial in a 
small market like Finland. 
On the other hand, a crucial research possibility in terms of the credibility of project 
RM would be the development and eventual implementation of such RM tools and 
practices, which allow risk analysis to be conducted unambiguously while not 
compromising process efficiency. Borrowing from Lehtiranta (2014): “Research should 
rather be concerned with understanding and supporting the mechanisms of assessing 
what type of uncertainty matters and how to identify and manage it. Alternatively, the 
finding can be taken as a challenge of identifying or innovating the quantitative 
techniques that would, in fact, fit into the project practice, resulting into less biased and 
more easily visualized risk information.”  
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6 Summary and conclusions 
A constructive research approach was taken upon to clarify and develop the Finnish 
Transport Agency’s waterway project risk management (RM) framework. Relevant 
preunderstanding on the subject was gathered from the literature, and through expert 
interviews and an expert survey. Based on the preunderstanding, the FTA waterway 
project risk management framework was evaluated following the technical report ISO 
31004:2013, which describes the implementation process of the RM standard ISO 
31000:2009. The evaluation of the framework allowed analysing the FTA RM practice 
in a structured and clear manner.  
The findings suggest that the focus of the FTA waterway project risk management has 
been in safety and health risks, while the risks affecting project objectives have not 
been given due attention. While the FTA guidelines for RM call for the management of 
risks affecting project objectives, the practice has not followed. Instead, the FTA 
waterway project RM framework was found to contain several deficiencies, which can 
be claimed: e.g. the lack of adequate tools, process descriptions, resources, and 
commitment for managing risk.  
Based on the identified development possibilities, the following risk management 
tools and processes were developed and validated though case studies and user 
group testing: 
1. three risk management processes tied to the structures of waterway projects,  
2. three hazard checklists,  
3. the inclusion of opportunity management,  
4. the enhancement of the risk analysis process, and  
5. a model for the establishment of the context of the risk management process. 
The results of the validation process suggest that the developed risk management 
tools and processes could be partly taken into practice as such, while some items 
should be further developed and discussed. On a larger scale, the developed RM tools 
and processes and their validation results appear to significantly improve the FTA 
waterway RM framework. 
Based on the findings, the management of risks affecting project objectives could be 
more fruitful when perceived as “uncertainty management” instead of looking for 
threats and opportunities. Even if the management of threats were a more intuitive 
way to manage safety risks, it seems counterintuitive from the point-of-view of 
managing risks to project objectives. Furthermore, the weaknesses of the current risk 
analysis methods should be acknowledged by the practitioners, and the possibility to 
make conclusions based on these methods should be discussed internally at the FTA.  
In the long term, the development and monitoring of RM inside the FTA should be 
systematic, and could for example include project personnel to develop their 
commitment. And from the projects’ perspective, the most beneficial RM process 
requires mutual trust between the project participants. The development of trust 
could be emphasized through, e.g. kick-off workshops or alliance contracting. 
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The level of RM described by the ISO 31000:2009 standard appears at least partly 
worth pursuing in waterway projects, while the ISO 31004:2013 technical paper 
describes a seemingly good structure for analysing and developing the RM 
framework. 
These results are expected to be valid in the Finnish waterway projects run by the 
FTA, and up to some extent in other types of FTA transport infrastructure projects. Yet 
it is likely, that any waterway project in the northern parts of the globe would be 
affected by similar risks, and thus some parts of the results or developed constructs 
may be applicable outside Finland. However, the reliability of the results is affected 
by the limited amount of data along with the subjective of interpretation of the 
results.  
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Appendix 1  
   
Waterway classification in Finland 
 
The FTA waterway classification
Adapted from Liikennevirasto 2013
VL1
First class 
maritime 
commerce 
waterways
Nationally or areally significant maritime 
commerce main waterways, which are used to 
transport a significant share of waterway 
transport.
VL2
Second class 
maritime 
commerce 
waterways
A maritime commerce waterway with mostly 
areal significance, or a parallel or connective 
waterway in the vicinity of a main waterway.
VL3
Shallow 
waterways for 
utility traffic
Waterways serving e.g. ferry traffic, fishing 
ships, barge traffic, timber rafting and areally 
significant passenger traffic.
VL4
Yachting main 
ways
A yachting main way, which forms a uniform, 
longer route on the coast or inland between 
two areas.
VL5
Local yachting 
waterways
A local waterway, e.g. the route from a main 
waterway to a harbour or a connecting line 
between two waterways
VL6
Yachting 
waterways
A low‐level shallow waterways serving 
yachting
MAIN CLASS WATERWAY CLASS
1
2
Shallow 
waterways
Maritime 
commerce 
waterways
A waterway built and 
maintained primarily for 
maritime commerce. 
Maritime commerce is used 
here to describe coastal 
traffic that pays waterway 
fee. In the freshwater 
environment the Saimaa 
deep waterways are 
understood as maritime 
commerce waterways.
Waterways built and 
maintained primarily for 
boat traffic or other traffic 
excluding maritime 
commerce
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Summaries of waterway project RM guidelines 
in Sweden and Denmark 
The waterway authorities in Sweden (Sjöfartsverket) and Denmark (Transport-
ministeriet) were expected to be potentially relevant in terms of benchmarking their 
approaches of waterway project risk management. This was supported by the 
countries’ relative similarity to Finland, and a good availability of information. These 
expectations were partly fulfilled in the frame of this research, and the summaries of 
the available documents are presented below. The information from the Sjöfart-
verket’s interviews is discussed in detail in Section 4.2.3. 
Sweden  
The risk analysis process for the organization-level approach of Sjöfartsverket 
consists of the following three phases (Sjöfartsverket 2016): 
1. Analysis of objectives and their sub-objectives. This also includes a screening 
of the strengths of dependencies between objectives (say, the availability of 
VTS services is a more important contributor to port activities than the 
communal rescue service). 
2. Risk identification concerning the predefined objectives. 
3. Risk analysis and risk treatment. The risks are first divided into the classes of 
sustainability (environmental, social, economic), and then analysed with a 
semi-quantitative risk matrix with scales from 1 to 4. The risk analysis 
approach is fairly similar to the FTA approach. 
 
The result of the process is a risk analysis report, similar to the FTA spreadsheet. 
Denmark 
From the perspective of financial steering of infrastructure projects, the Danish 
Ministry of Transport divides the projects into 5 phases (Transportministeriet 2010): 
1) Preliminary research and consequent decision making 
2) Proposal for decision making and construction decision making 
3) Detailed planning 
4) Tendering 
5) Construction and introduction 
Even though this research considers only the construction and maintenance projects, 
the risk assessment methodology in the planning phases are shortly summarized here 
to provide a background for understanding the steering in the latter phases. It should 
be noted, that based the Transportministeriets document (2010), risk and financial 
governance should be regarded as tightly spun together. This enables a better level of 
financial forecasting, and the possibility for the Danish Ministry of Transport to see 
the whole picture of risks in their different projects. On a practical level, the budget 
takes financial risk into account on both the project level and on the level of single 
risks. 
76 
In phases 1 and 2, the financial and the risk management plans are reviewed by an 
external operator, which focuses on the “weak points” and the feasibility of the project 
plans. From the decision making’s point of view, the assumptions made in the budget 
are explicated, and the consequences of those assumptions not holding true are clearly 
stated. 
STRATEGY
AND
ACTIVITIES
Individual
observations
Technical
analysis
RISK ASSESSMENTS
Risk register
Workshops
BUDGET
ESTIMATE
Figure 15:  A flowchart describing the risk management process of a single project
  (Transportministeriet 2010:25).
The Figure 15 describes the risk register management process in the Danish transport 
infrastructure projects, and depicts how the identified risks affect the project budget, 
and how risk assessments are seen as separate from the risk register.
During a project’s construction planning, tendering and introduction (phases 3-5), the 
project status is reported twice a year, including the development and updates in the 
project’s risk register. Formal risk assessments are conducted with similar intervals, 
with regard to the project status report. (Transportministeriet 2010:30–36).
From the safety, or navigational risk perspective of all the waterway projects in 
Denmark, both in public and private projects, the planning phase risks are assessed 
based on a specific assessment form by Soefartsstyrelsen (201Pha3). In the case of 
larger construction projects, the Formal Safety Assessment by the IMO (2002) can 
be required (Soefartsstyrelsen 2016a). On the practical level of identifying risks and 
their potential treatment methods, the hearing of seafarers and related authorities is 
included as a compulsory step of the Soefartsstyrelsen’s (2016b) permit process.
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Interview Questions 
The following questions were discussed during the semi-structured interviews: 
1) Preliminary information: 
a) Job label 
b) Short description of tasks and work history 
2) How familiar are you with risk management?  In which kind of projects are you 
familiar with it? 
3) What kind of tools have you used for managing risk? Do you acknowledge your 
affiliates to have used certain tools? (E.g. risk matrix, risk map) 
4) Which guidelines and materials have you used for risk management? 
5) Do you find that risk map, risk matrix and risk management plan are adequate 
tools for use in waterway project risk management? Why/why not? 
6) What kind of benefits do you perceive that risk management brings/could bring to 
waterway projects? 
7) How are these benefits measured or how should they be measured? 
8) Has the information provided through risk management been systematically 
taken into account in decision making? 
9) Do you find that your know-how in risk management is adequate, taken your 
position? What kind of things do you find challenging? 
10) How does the risk management you have done in the projects of the FTA compare 
with the risk management conducted in your own business activity? (Not asked 
from the FTA, Sjöfartsverket or Trafikverket interviewees.)  
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Survey scoring methodology and survey form 
The results and the general methodology of the survey are discussed in section 4.1. 
A4.1 Survey scoring methodology 
RM experience score (1–5) 
The participants evaluated their experience of RM in six categories of waterway 
projects: planning, construction, and maintenance in both sea and freshwater 
environments. Each of these categories was evaluated on an ordinal scale from 1 to 5, 
with the explanations:  
1. No experience 
2. (empty) 
3. I have participated in a risk assessment 
4. (empty) 
5. Is an essential part of my job description 
The points of the categories were averaged for each participant, resulting in a “RM 
experience score” on an ordinal scale from 1 to 5. 
Risk type score (1–3) 
The evaluation of RM experience of different risk types was conducted in a similar 
manner as the RM experience score, but the ordinal scale for each category ranged 
from 1 to 3, without the empty categories in between: 
1. No experience 
2. I have participated in a risk assessment 
3. Is an essential part of my job description 
These questions were asked specifically with a requirement that the RM has had to be 
systematic, where systematic was defined as “the management activity being 
retraceable”. However, it must be noted, that this requirement does not necessarily 
guarantee a RM approach that would comply with any standard, and also given that a 
“trace” can mean practically anything, the answers cannot be interpreted as to have 
practical relevance except for being compared with each other. 
The evaluated risk types included the following: work safety, traffic safety, quality, 
environmental, economic, schedule, political, reputation and RM failure risk. 
The points of the categories were averaged for each participant, resulting in a “risk 
type score” on an ordinal scale from 1 to 3. 
RM benefits and drawbacks 
The respondents were given a list of possible RM benefits as listed in the ISO 
31000:2009, to which was added a statement about “facilitating project success”, and 
a comparably shorter list of possible drawbacks due to RM. The respondents were 
asked to tick the benefits and drawbacks they identified with RM. The respondents 
were also given the possibility to write a benefit or a drawback of their own. 
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← Previous  Next →
Risk management in waterway projects
Information about the respondent
1. The respondent *
Forename
Surname
District (of operations)
2. Public or private sector? *
Answer based on your current employer.
Private, which company? 
Public, which department? 
3. Job description *
Tell with a few words about your: 
1) job description
2) working experience in the planning, construction and maintenance projects in both freshwater and sea
waterways
Next →
Risk management in waterway projects
This survey strives to gather information about the current state of waterway project risk management, and
development ideas for developing a common framework for waterway project risk management.
The survey will take approximately five minutes to complete.
The answers are confidential, and they cannot be matched to the respondent by others than the survey
administrator. Additional information: oliver.heinonen@ramboll.fi 
Thank you for your cooperation!
A4.2 Survey form
The form is a direct translation form the original, Finnish survey form.
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Risk management in waterway projects
4. How familiar are you with risk management in the following types of projects? *
1) No experience
3) I have participated in a risk assessment
5) Is an essential part of my job description
1 2 3 4 5
Sea way planning
Sea way construction
Sea way maintenance
Freshwater way planning
Freshwater way construction
Freshwater way maintenance
5. Which of the following risk types have you SYSTEMATICALLY assessed and managed in the
forementioned projects?
Systematic risk management leaves a document, which allows for evaluation of success afterwards.
Explanation:
1) No experience
2) I have participated in a risk assessment
3) Is an essential part of my job description
1 2 3
Occupational health and safety risk
Traffic or other safety risk
Quality risk
Environmental risk
Economic risk
Schedule risk
Political risk
Reputational risk
Risk assessment or monitoring failure risk
Other risk, what: 
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6. What drawbacks do you believe are inflicted by a systematic approach on waterway project risk
management? *
Take into account, that the drawbacks can affect in various kinds of waterway projects, and on an upper level.
Increase in workload
Increase of expenses
Increase of useless bureaucracy
Increase of requirements
Focusing on irrelevant
Weakening of information flow
Deterioration of stakeholder trust
Something else, what: 
7. What benefits do you believe are inflicted by a systematic approach on waterway project risk
management? *
Take into account, that the benefits can affect in various kinds of waterway projects, and on an upper level.
Facilitating of carrying out projects
Increasing the likelihood of achieving objectives
Encouragement of proactive management
Improvement in the identification of opportunities and threats
Improvement in reporting
Improvement in information flow
Improvement in stakeholder trust
Establishing a reliable basis for desicion making and planning
Effective allocation and use of resources
Improvement in operational effectiveness and efficiency
Enhancement in expense control
Enhancement in health and safety performance, as well as in environmental protection
Improvement of loss prevention and incident management
Improvement of organizational learning and resilience
Something else, what: 
8. Free word
Development ideas, tips and other thoughts are taken in very gladly!
← Previous  Submit
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Summaries of the FTA RM framework 
documents and systems 
The formal, partly public, partly FTA internal framework structure concerning 
waterway project RM consists of the following documents: 
1. FTA RM Principles (Liikennevirasto 2016d) 
2. FTA RM Protocol for transport infrastructure projects (Liikennevirasto 2015) 
3. Safety risk management procedure for infrastructure projects 
(Liikennevirasto 2012) 
4. RM in railway planning (Liikennevirasto 2010) 
5. Risks in road care service agreements (Tiehallinto 2009) 
6. The FTA process management system 
7. Safety and RM register (TURI) 
8. Internal tender and project management guidelines and contract forms 
The documents 1–5 are publicly available to service providers. Systems and 
guidelines 6–8 are available to FTA employees and to service providers through 
agreements. 
1. FTA RM principles (Liikennevirasto 2016d) 
The document describes the RM policy; the objectives, principles, responsibilities and 
implementation of RM on the FTA level. 
The following are listed as the objectives of RM in the FTA: 
1. increase the likelihood of achieving objectives; 
2. improve the identification and management of opportunities and threats; 
3. improve governance; 
4. establish a reliable basis for decision making and planning, and for allocating 
resources; 
5. comply with relevant legal and regulatory requirements and international 
norms; and 
6. secure funds and property. 
RM should be transparent and comprehensive; the stakeholders in- and outside FTA 
should be included in the process. Internal communication increases risk awareness, 
helps to learn from the realized risks and to understand the made decisions 
throughout the FTA. The communication channels for risk include project meetings 
and the internal communication channels of the FTA. 
The RM resources should be in relation to the expected gains. Taking risks should 
always be a well-considered, case-dependent decision, which requires evaluating the 
expenses of both the risk treatment option and the significance of the risk in a 
uniform manner. This enables comparing the risk and its treatment. However, risks 
affecting safety or environment should always be minimized and controlled.  
Risks are classified to strategic, process and project risks, where the strategic risks 
affect the whole FTA, the process risks affect a certain process which usually 
encompasses a number of projects at once, such as the development of the waterway 
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network, and finally the project risks affect a single project, such as the Rauma harbor 
waterway deepening project. 
2. FTA RM protocol for transport infrastructure projects (Liikennevirasto 2015) 
The FTA guideline defines the risk management approach for infrastructure projects. 
It can be seen as the building block between the RM principles and the infrastructure-
type specific risk management frameworks. 
The infrastructure projects, to which the guideline is applied, span a great variety of 
projects when it comes to temporal, spatial or monetary figures. Thus, the guideline 
defines infrastructure project risk management in a fairly top-level manner, and refers 
to other guidelines and tools for application to specific infrastructure types. 
The guideline lists four central principles of risk management: 
1. Risk assessment is a part of the decision making, leading, planning and 
controlling of a project. 
2. Confirming that the made decisions do not surpass the appointed risk level or 
risk management capability is a part of decision making. 
3. The project actively reduces or removes risk through its own actions. 
4. Accidents are prepared to with plans, which ensure an efficient delimitation 
of damage and quick repairing actions. 
In addition to these, the guideline explicitly states a group of other principles for risk 
management: 
5. Risk management is done consciously, and is planned and continuous. 
6. Risk management has to span all of the risks and problems related to the 
different phases of the project. 
7. The goal of risk management is to produce a safe product in a controlled 
manner. 
The guideline divides infrastructure projects into the planning, construction, and 
maintenance phases, and describes the required safety and risk management 
documents in each phase. It lists risk types and existing FTA hazard checklists which 
are to be assessed in each project phase. These hazard checklists include the Safety 
risk identification procedure for infrastructure projects (Liikennevirasto 2012), RM in 
railway planning (Liikennevirasto 2010), and Risks in road care service agreements 
(Tiehallinto 2009). The hazard checklists are each a part of a separate risk 
management guideline or manual, but the use of both the checklists and the manuals 
can be adapted according to the project. 
The requirements of transferring RM-based knowledge between projects and project 
phases are defined, although the practical procedures are not included in the 
document. 
The described risk management process is similar to the one of ISO 31000:2009, and 
a short guidance for assessing risks through workshops is included. 
The guideline defines “the essential tools of risk management”. These include SWOT-
analysis, risk maps and hazard checklists, a risk management plan form and a risk 
matrix. 
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3. Safety risk identification procedure for infrastructure projects (Liikennevirasto 
2012) 
The Safety risk identification procedure for infrastructure projects, also known as the 
INFRA risk map, is a manual, to which is attached a risk management form, a risk 
matrix, and several hazard checklists with a risk map front page enabling a quick peek 
on a project’s safety concerns. 
The manual describes a risk management process in which the attached tools can be 
used, the descriptions for their application, the required documents in each project 
phase, and guidance for assessing risks through workshops, along with an example of 
participants of a waterway-related RM workshop. 
The hazard checklists cover the following subjects: 
1. Working environment 
2. Traffic 
3. Dangerous jobs 
4. Other activities 
5. Occupational health 
6. Implementation and use 
The checklist items include e.g. general work methods, work phases and items, and 
abstract dangers or concerns. 
In the context of the definitions made in the RM protocol for transport infrastructure 
projects (Liikennevirasto 2015), the safety risk identification procedure combines a 
group of essential tools of risk management. 
4. RM in railway planning (Liikennevirasto 2010) 
The guideline describes in detail the policy, process, objectives, principles, methods 
and practices of both RM and single risk assessments. The included RM tools follow 
the structure of the Safety risk identification procedure for infrastructure projects 
(Liikennevirasto 2012), in order to achieve compatibility between methods, although 
SWOT-analysis is also included for use in the preliminary planning phase. 
The hazard checklists cover the following subjects: 
1. Risks relating to the execution of the project 
2. Process risks [read: project management risks] 
3. Planning risks 
4. Environmental risks 
5. Risks of construction and maintenance phases 
 
While the titles appear universal, the lists do not in practice apply to waterway 
projects. The list number 2 makes an exception, and is applicable, though it does 
contain some railway vocabulary. 
5. Risks in road care service agreements (Tiehallinto 2009) 
The guideline handles risk management principles and practices in planning, 
tendering and execution of road care service agreements. This includes detailed 
process descriptions of both the RM process and the risk assessments, descriptions of 
the required documents, and some guidance for a risk-informed tendering process. 
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The included RM tools follow the structure of the Safety risk identification procedure 
for infrastructure projects (Liikennevirasto 2012). 
The hazard checklists cover the planning, tendering and execution of service 
agreements thoroughly, but on a very general level, and thus they could be useful in 
waterway related service agreement tendering processes as well. 
6. The FTA process management system 
The FTA process management system describes all the processes in the FTA. The 
processes are described hierarchically. The top level consists of the main processes of 
the organization, which in turn consist of a number of sub-processes. Each of these 
processes is appointed to an owner, which correspond or should correspond to the 
management hierarchy of the FTA.  
The risks to the main process match the strategic risks of the FTA, while the risks to 
the sub-processes correspond to the process risks, which are defined in the FTA RM 
Principles (2016d). 
The process management system is under development, and the process descriptions 
are not complete. 
7. Safety and RM register (TURI) 
The safety and RM register of the FTA is a system for containing the information of 
the safety and project risks, and the detected safety anomalies in FTA projects and on 
the rail network.  
The risk register includes fields for risk description and consequence, risk treatment 
and its follow-up, and risk level before and after the treatment, which is based on the 
semi-qualitative FTA 5x5 risk matrix. 
The full-scale commissioning of the system in all FTA projects was underway during 
the writing of this thesis, and was bound to finish by the end of year 2016. 
8. The FTA internal tender and project management guidelines and contract 
forms 
The internal tender and project management guidelines and contract forms can be 
found in an FTA internal wiki-like-environment – the term “project management 
toolbox” might describe it well. 
In terms of waterway project RM, the toolbox provides an example of a risk 
management plan, contract forms including safety risk management tools, and 
guidelines for tendering and management of each project phase.  
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The constructs
A6.1 Waterway project RM process descriptions
The processes are described on a general level in Section 4.4.1.
Risk
assessment
RISK ASSESSMENT
Project risk assessment is conducted in three phases: 1) Project 
management risk assessment, 2) Project risk assessment, and 3) 
Safety and health risk assessment.
Project management risk and project risk assessment is conducted 
with the tools provided as appendixes to this framework. The safety 
and health risk assessment is conducted with the INFRA risk map, 
a.k.a. the Safety risk identification method, and it’s result should be 
accounted for in the compulsory safety documents in addition to the 
safety risk management plan.
Risk assessment consists of risk identification, risk analysis and risk 
treatment planning. Risks should always be evaluated in regard to the 
project objectives, allowing for positive risk. The risk assessment 
procedure is described in more detail as a part of the attached tools.
Risk assessment should be planned with additional thoroughness, 
should a) the project include specific requirements for risk 
management, b) the project be exceptionally demanding, or c) the 
project include risks with hazardous consequences, which are 
challenging to analyse, or demanding or expensive to remarkably 
diminish. In these cases it may be necessary to use specific 
methodology along with a risk management professional.
RECOGNISED RISKS
The figure is used to describe the identified and analysed project risks, 
which are described in the risk management plan. 
A part of the project’s risks can be forwarded to the service provider 
through contracts. Risks should usually be carried by the stakeholders, 
which are in the best position to carry and manage them.
Risk
management 
activity
Recognised
risks
RISK MANAGEMENT ACTIVITY
The figure is used to describe other risk management activity than risk 
assessments.
LEGEND
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Project launch RA
Owner’s risks
PROJECT LAUNCH RISK ASSESSMENT
Before beginning the risk management process, the risk approach for 
the project should be coarsely planned; can this process description be 
used as such?
During the project launch RA the risk management plan is created or 
updated from the following viewpoints:
1. Project management risks – special weight on the risks related to 
tendering; the other risks can be dealt with in detail later. 
2. Project risks
3. Safety and health risks
The client should ensure the following when appropriate while planning 
risk management:
• The leftover risk information from the planning phase have been 
exploited
• The interfaces of the project with the FTA process level and main 
process level risks have been evaluated, and the risk treatments are 
accordingly planned. 
• All risk types have been assessed
• The risks have been compared with the risks identified in similar 
projects along with their anomalies
• Responsibilities for the risks’ treatments have been initially planned 
in order for the risks to be considered in the tender process 
• The risks affecting the owner have an adequate treatment plan, and 
the actions are sufficient in relation to an acceptable risk level
Stakeholder
risks
Allocation of risks to 
service providers 
through tender process
ALLOCATION OF RISKS TO SERVICE PROVIDERS 
THROUGH TENDER PROCESS
The owner should take the following into account while preparing tender 
documents:
• Transferring the chosen risks to the service providers
• The possibility to require the service providers to plan risk response 
to the risks appointed to them, and thus ensure adequate 
understanding about the risk. The identified risks can be given to the 
service providers for them to analyse, which provokes discussion on 
risk.
• Tender process risks
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CONSTRUCTION LAUNCH RISK ASSESSMENT
The risk management plan is updated.
The following things should be ensured as appropriate while planning 
the construction phase RM:
• The possible changes to the FTA process level and main process 
level risks have been accounted for 
• All risk types have been assessed
• The risks have been compared with the risks identified in similar 
projects by the service provider
• Risk owners and risk treatment responsibilities have been planned
• The risks affecting the owner have an adequate treatment plan, and 
the actions are sufficient in relation to the acceptable risk level
Construction launch
RA
Owner’s risks
Contractor’s
risks
Stakeholder
risks
FINAL MEETING
In the final meeting the following is stated:
1. The risks continuing on to the maintenance phase
2. The realised risks, their effects to the project, the remediating actions 
done, and the lessons learned in terms of RM
3. Safety anomalies during the project 
4. The location of the project RM documents in the FTA information 
systems along with the RM documents of other finished projects, in 
order for them to be exploited in the projects to come
5. Feedback from the RM methods and processes
Final meeting
Maintenance
phase risks
RM review
2-4 per year
RISK MANAGEMENT REVIEW
The regularly kept reviews ensure the flow of knowledge between the 
stakeholders, while evaluating:
1. The changes in identified risks due to successful treatment of or other 
reasons
2. Whether the treatment plan is up-to-date
3. Evolution of new risks and changes in the previously identified risks
Risks and their development should be kept on the agenda of 
construction site and planning meetings, and the third parties should be 
informed of risks when required. 
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Tender preparation RA
Owner’s risks
TENDER PREPARATION RISK ASSESSMENT
Before beginning the risk assessment process, the risk management 
approach for the tendering process should be updated or planned. 
Special value should be given to the risk management in this phase, 
when the division of risks between the client and the service provider 
can be affected.
The risk assessment should be done at latest, when the next year’s 
tender process is being prepared. The previous projects should be 
learnt from as much as possible.
The client should ensure the following when appropriate while planning 
risk management:
• The leftover risk information from the previous and parallel projects 
and from possible construction projects has been exploited, along 
with the anomaly reports
• The interfaces of the project with the FTA process level and main 
process level risks have been evaluated, and the risk treatments are 
accordingly planned. 
• All risk types have been assessed from the tender process’s point of 
view.
• Responsibilities for the risk treatments have been initially planned, 
and they are sufficient in relation to an acceptable risk level
Stakeholder
risks
Allocation of risks to 
service providers 
through tender process
ALLOCATION OF RISKS TO SERVICE PROVIDERS 
THROUGH TENDER PROCESS
The owner should take the following into account while preparing 
tender documents:
• Transferring the chosen risks to the service providers
• The possibility to require the service providers to plan risk response 
to the risks appointed to them, and thus ensure adequate 
understanding about the risk. The identified risks can be given to 
the service providers for them to analyse, which provokes 
discussion on risk.
• Tender process risks
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AGREEMENT PERIOD LAUNCH RA
The risk management plan is updated.
The following things should be ensured as appropriate while planning the 
construction phase RM:
• The possible changes to the FTA process level and main process level 
risks have been accounted for 
• All risk types have been assessed
• The risks have been compared with the risks identified in similar 
projects by the service provider
• Risk owners and risk treatment responsibilities have been planned
• The risks affecting the owner have an adequate treatment plan, and the 
actions are sufficient in relation to the acceptable risk level
Agreement period
launch RA
Owner’s risks
Contractor’s
risks
Stakeholder
risks
FINAL MEETING
In the final meeting the following is stated:
1. The risks continuing on to the maintenance phase
2. The realised risks, their effects to the project, the remediating actions 
done, and the lessons learned in terms of RM
3. Safety anomalies during the project 
4. The location of the project RM documents in the FTA information 
systems along with the RM documents of other finished projects, in 
order for them to be exploited in the projects to come
5. Feedback from the RM methods and processes
Final meeting
Maintenance
phase risks
RM review
2-4 per year
RISK MANAGEMENT REVIEW
The regularly kept reviews ensure the flow of knowledge between the 
stakeholders, while evaluating:
1. The changes in identified risks due to successful treatment of or other 
reasons
2. Whether the treatment plan is up-to-date
3. Evolution of new risks and changes in the previously identified risks
Risks and their development should be kept on the agenda of 
construction site and planning meetings, and the third parties should be 
informed of risks when required. 
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PROJECT PLANNING LAUNCH PROJECT
PERIOD
FINISH
UPKEEP PROJECTS
Project RA Final meeting
Maintenance
risks
Owner’s risks
Contractor’s
risks
Stakeholder
risks
Project planning RA
Owner’s risks
Stakeholder
risks
RM follow-up, 
process
development, 
update
coordination
and risk
updates
MAINTENANCE / UPKEEP
UPKEEP RISK MANAGEMENT
The upkeep projects are very variable in terms of time, scale and other attributes. It 
is relevant for the RM approach and the project features to be in line with each 
other.
The risk management methods are preliminarily divided into three groups below
based on the size of project:
• SMALL: RM can be dealt with through e-mail or phone in projects worth less than
100 000 € or with duration of less than 1 month
• MEDIUM: Projects worth less than 500 000 € should include RM methodology as 
parts of construction site and other meetings
• LARGE: Projects worth more than 500 000 € should manage risks in full-scale RM 
meetings (e.g. before construction site meeteings)
The RM approach should always be in accordance with the project demandingness, 
uniqueness and circumstances. The project-specific risks should always be identified. 
Especially in small projects, involving repetitive and well forecastable jobs, the RA 
can be done using only system description. In this case the project is divided into 
single jobs and work phases, and each is pursued for risks, or factors causing 
uncertainty.
The risks should be written down in small projects as well – shortly but 
unambiguously, e.g. using the first three columns of the risk management form. If a 
risk clearly surpasses the risk appetite before its dedicated treatment, all the 
columns should be filled for that risk.
In large projects the RM methodology approaches the methodology of a construction 
project, which are described above.
When a project is terminated, a short feedback form should be sent to the contractor 
about the RM procedures in the project. This can be a part of a larger feedback 
survey.
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PROJECT PLANNING LAUNCH PROJECT
PERIOD
FINISH
UPKEEP PROJECTS
Project RA Final meeting
Maintenance
risks
Owner’s risks
Contractor’s
risks
Sta eholder
risks
Project planning RA
Owner’s risks
Stakeholder
risks
RM follow-up, 
process
development, 
update
coordination
and risk
updates
MAINTENANCE / UPKEEP
UPKEEP RISK MANAGEMENT
The upkeep projects are very variable in terms of time, scale and other attributes. It 
is relevant for the RM approach and the project features to be in line with each 
other.
The risk management methods are preliminarily divided into three groups below
based on the size of project:
• SMALL: RM can be dealt with through e-mail or phone in projects worth less than
100 000 € or with duration of less than 1 month
• MEDIUM: Projects worth less than 500 000 € should include RM methodology as 
parts of construction site and other meetings
• LARGE: Projects worth more than 500 000 € should manage risks in full-scale RM 
meetings (e.g. before construction site meeteings)
The RM approach should always be in accordance with the project demandingness, 
uniqueness and circumstances. The project-specific risks should always be identified. 
Especially in small projects, involving repetitive and well forecastable jobs, the RA 
can be done using only system description. In this case the project is divided into 
single jobs and work phases, and each is pursued for risks, or factors causing 
uncertainty.
The risks should be written down in small projects as well – shortly but 
unambiguously, e.g. using the first three columns of the risk management form. If a 
risk clearly surpasses the risk appetite before its dedicated treatment, all the 
columns should be filled for that risk.
In large projects the RM methodology approaches the methodology of a construction 
project, which are described above.
When a project is terminated, a short feedback form should be sent to the contractor 
about the RM procedures in the project. This can be a part of a larger feedback 
survey.
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A6.2 Hazard checklists 
1. Project management checklist 
1.1 Contracting and resposibilities 
1 Assignment contents 
2 Resposibilities and their allocation 
3 Contract interfaces 
4 Changes/additions in contracts 
5 Warranties, insurances 
6 Conflict resolution 
7 Work quality defects 
8 Quality assurance 
9 Responsibilities for plans and their quality 
  
  
1.2 Guidelines and regulations 
1 Technical guidelines and regulations 
2 Safety regulations 
3 Environmental regulations 
4 Other regulations 
5 
Regulation changes during the project 
(laws, norms, EU-enactments) 
6 Application of guidelines and regulations 
7 Client's guidelines 
8 Other guidelines 
  
  
1.3 Society 
1 Acceptability achievement 
2 Interaction and informing 
3 Public image 
4 Political cycles 
5 Government economy 
  
  
1.4 Resources and know-how 
1 Client's resources 
2 Service provider resources 
3 Special know-how 
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1.5 Permits 
1 Acknowledging permit requirements 
2 Conditions for permits 
3 Permit schedules 
4 Permit complaints 
5 
Changing requirements of permit 
authorities 
6 Permit terms 
7 Authority resources 
  
  
1.6 Schedule 
1 Authority processing times 
2 Prolonging of planning / construction 
3 Realism of schedules 
4 Critical points of schedules 
5 Implementation schedules 
6 Effects of other projects 
7 Special schedules 
  
  
1.7 Cooperation and information flow 
1 Municipalities 
2 Authorities 
3 Harbors 
4 Pilotage 
5 Other organizations 
6 Inahbitants, citizens 
7 Service providers 
8 Service users 
9 Other traffic forms 
10 Construction site atmosphere 
  
  
1.8 Finance 
1 Project estimate and its structure 
2 Market situation 
3 Government funding 
4 Municipality funding 
5 Other funding (ppp, companies, EU) 
6 Contracting prices, market situation 
7 Budgets, finance monitoring 
8 Plan quality and research accuracy 
  
  
  Appendix 6 / 9 (16) 
   
1.9 Tendering 
1 Contract terms 
2 Source information 
3 Bidding, tender process 
4 The amount of offers 
5 Complaint process 
6 Contract documents 
7 Interaction during the bidding process 
  
  
 
2. Construction checklist 
2.1 Dredging and quarrying 
1 Mass balance 
2 Dredging technique 
3 
Quarrying and intermediate storing of 
explosives 
4 Blasting (danger to outsiders) 
5 Scanning 
6 Working order 
7 Storage and loading 
8 Relocation of lines and devices 
9 Braking of safety devices 
  
  
2.2 Fills 
1 Contaminated soil 
2 Mass balance 
3 Fill solutions and capacity 
  
  
2.3 Civil engineering structures 
1 Piers and erosion slabs 
2 Bridges 
3 Harbors 
4 Canals 
5 Locks 
6 Embankments, mass stability 
7 User requirements 
8 Erosion 
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2.4 Navigation marks 
1 Fixed navigation marks 
2 Buoyant navigation marks 
3 Temporary navigation mark arrangements 
4 Navigation signs 
5 Light and energy device work 
6 Informing from the work 
7 Care responsibilities 
  
  
2.5 Environment 
1 Contaminated soil 
2 
Spreading of contaminated sediments and 
nutrients 
3 Cloudiness of surface waters 
4 Oil leaks ashore and to water 
5 Solvent, paint, etc. substance leaks 
6 
Noise in the vicinity of housing or 
environmental protection areas 
7 The effect of the noise to fishes 
8 Effects to fishing industry 
9 
Work in the vicinity of nesting areas during 
nesting season 
  
  
2.6 Waterborne traffic 
1 Communication and informing 
2 Communication during emergencies 
3 Traffic and construction works coordination 
4 
Non-pilotaged traffic, pilotage service 
providers and shipbrokers 
5 Maintenance traffic external to the project 
6 
Construction site traffic, coordination of 
multiple contracts 
7 Yachting, fishing 
8 Reacting to changing markings 
  
  
2.7 Weather 
1 Exposure to wind, swell 
2 
Ice circumstances, duration of open water 
season 
3 Weather conditions during lifting 
4 Blasting works during lightning 
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2.8 Technical matters 
1 Special solutions 
2 
Water level measurement, coordinate 
systems 
3 Satellite positioning 
4 Equipment failure 
5 Anchoring 
6 Water flow 
  
  
2.9 Other 
1 Diving work 
2 Surveys 
3 Documentation of changes 
4 Sea-lane enactment 
  
  
 
3. Maintenance checklist 
USE AND CARE 
3.1 Fixed navigation marks 
1 Light and energy device work 
2 Sector work 
3 Radar beacon work 
4 Clearing; environment care 
5 Risk caused by structural type 
6 Work at a height, and climbing 
7 Onshoring 
  
  
3.2 Buoyant navigation marks 
1 Light and energy device work 
2 Anchoring 
3 Pre-tensioning 
4 Lifting 
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3.3 Other navigation mark work 
  
1 Navigation mark condition monitoring 
2 Navigation mark remote control 
3 
Navigation mark installation, relocation, 
modification and removal 
4 Temporary navigation mark arrangements 
5 Navigation signs 
6 Care work 
7 Diving work 
8 Electrical work 
9 Hot work operation 
10 Surface treatments 
  
  
3.4 Canals 
  
1 Condition monitoring 
2 Remote control 
3 Lighting 
4 Clearing; environment care 
5 Shaft work 
6 Diving work 
7 Electrical work 
8 Building of maintenance dams 
9 Winter traffic assistance 
  
UPKEEP 
3.3 Need for separate risk identification: 
  
1 Planning 
2 Keeping of register 
3 
Sea-lane enactment, see a separate list of 
enactment documents 
  
  
3.4 Waterways and navigation marks 
1 
Monitoring of civil engineering structure 
condition (lighthouses, piers, cardinal 
marks etc.) 
2 Renovation and construction 
3 Dredging, see "Construction" checklist 
4 Fixed navigation marks 
5 Buoyant navigation marks 
6 Temporary navigation mark arrangements 
7 
Navigation mark installation, relocation, 
modification and removal 
8 Anchoring 
9 Navigation signs 
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10 Surface treatments 
11 Diving works 
  
3.5 Canals 
1 Renovation and construction 
2 Surface treatments 
3 Diving works 
  
  
3.6 Investigations 
1 Sounding, laser and multibeam 
2 Scanning 
3 Ground surveying and boring 
  
  
COMMON FACTORS 
3.7 Environment 
1 Oil leaks 
2 Solvent, paint, etc. substance leaks 
3 
Noise in the vicinity of housing or 
environmental protection areas 
4 
Work in the vicinity of nesting areas during 
nesting season 
5 Bird nests in navigation marks 
6 Bird and animal excrements 
7 Effects to fishing industry 
8 Water flow 
  
  
3.8 Waterborne traffic 
1 Communication and informing 
2 Communication during emergencies 
3 Traffic and construction works coordination 
4 Other waterborne traffic 
5 Reacting to changing markings 
6 
Loss of steerability, anchor failure, ship 
handling 
  
  
3.9 Weather 
1 Exposure to wind, swell 
2 
Ice circumstances, duration of open water 
season 
3 Weather conditions during lifting 
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4 Frost, cold working conditions 
5 Water level alternation 
  
3.10 Technical matters 
1 
Information traffic (incl. satellite 
positioning) 
2 Equipment failure 
3 Anchoring 
4 Water level measurement, coordinate 
systems 
5 Sea warnings and navigation mark error 
messages 
  
  
3.11 Other 
1 Documentation of changes 
2 Logging of actions 
3 Care responsibilities 
4 Haste 
5 Common worksites 
6 Storage and harbor operations 
  
  
 
A6.3 Model for establishing a project’s RM 
process context 
The model and its use are demonstrated through the three examples from the three 
case studies. Two of the case examples are provided below, and the third can be found 
in Section 4.4.5. 
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CASE A: DREDGING PROJECT
RM PROCESS CONTEXT
OBJECTIVE:
PROJECT EXECUTION SAFELY, 
EFFICIENTLY AND 
ENVIRONMENTALLY FRIENDLY
SAFE AND 
FLOWING
TRAFFIC
MASS
TRANSFERS
DREDGING
QUARRYING
LANDFILL
TEMPORARY
NAVIGATION
MARKS
RESCUE
SERVICES
TRAFFIC
MANAGEMENT
AND PILOTAGE
COORDINATION 
WITH HARBOR 
AND INDUSTRY 
OPERATIONS
RESEARCH
AND
ENVIRONMENT
WATER
QUALITY AND 
FISH
MONITORING
MULTIBEAM
AND DIVING 
SURVEYS
AUXILIARY
ACTIVITIES
PROJ. MGMT, 
SUPERVISION
AND
PROCESSES
INFORMATION
FLOW AND 
COMMUNI-
CATION
QUALITY
ASSURANCE
STORAGE AND 
HARBOR 
ACTIVITIES
WATERWAY
MAINTENANCE
PLANS AND 
DATA MODELS
TRAFFIC
COORDI-
NATION
PERMITS
CASE B: CARE PROJECT
RM PROCESS CONTEXT
OBJECTIVE:
PROJECT EXECUTION SAFELY, 
EFFICIENTLY AND 
ENVIRONMENTALLY FRIENDLY
REACTIVE
WORK
PROACTIVE
WORK
CONDITION
MONITORING
MAINTENANCE
WORK
FAULT
REPARATION
INFORMATION
FLOW AND 
COMMUNICATION
ACTION
LOGGING
SEA
WARNINGS
AND ERROR 
MESSAGES
AUXILIARY
ACTIVITIES
PROJ. MGMT, 
SUPERVISION
AND
PROCESSES
GUIDELINES,
PLANNING
QUALITY
ASSURANCE
STORAGE AND 
HARBOR 
ACTIVITIES
ADDITIONAL
AND CHANGE 
WORK
PERMITS
USER 
FEEDBACK
SAFETY
MANAGEMENT
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Risk level analysis
Risk consequence
- What would usually follow from the realization of the risk
- What would be the consequence in the best/worst case
- Project specific
Consequence type 1
No consequences
2
Slight
3
Serious/remarkable
4
Big
5
Very big
5
Very big
4
Big
3
Remarkable
2
Slight
1
No consequences
Personal injury No injured Slight injuries,
sick leave less than 14 days
Serious injuries,
sick leave more than 14 days
Deaths Several deaths Zero injuries - usability
depends on project
Financial effect No property or business
damage
Financial effect
Less than 2000 €
Financial effect
2 000 - 1 000 000 €
Financial effect
1 000 000 - 5 000 000 €
Financial effect
More than 5 000 000 €
Financial effect
More than 5 000 000 €
Financial effect
1 000 000 - 5 000 000 €
Financial effect
2 000 - 1 000 000 €
Financial effect
Less than 2000 €
No property or business
damage
Operational effect No effect to planning or
contract schedule
No claims
Hinders planning or contractor
work
Small claims
Impedes planning or
contractor work
Serious claims
A month's delay in the project
schedule
Big claims
Several months' delay in
schedule
Very big claims
Several months' reducement
in the project schedule
Very big improvement in
quality
A month's reducement in the
project schedule
Big improvement in quality
Promotes planning or
contractor work
Remarkable improvement in
quality
Slightly promotes planning or
contractor work
Slight improvement in quality
No effect to planning or
contract schedule
No quality effect
Traffic effect No effect on traffic Slight traffic impediment Serious traffic impediment Big traffic impediment Very big traffic impediment Very big traffic benefits Big traffic benefits Remarkable traffic benefits Slight traffic benefits No effect on traffic
Risk probability
- How often is the realization possible
- How often does the risk realize
Environmental effect No environmental damage Slight environmental damage,
minor impediments, easily
repairable
Serious environmental
damage, moderate
impediments,  repairable
Big environmental damage,
moderate and vast
impediments,  repairable
Very big environmental
damage, moderate and vast
long-term impediments,
hardly repairable
Very big ecosystem-level
environmental benefit
Big environmental benefits Remarkable environmental
benefits
Slight environmental benefits No effect on environment
Risk probability
Literate description
Percentual
probabilities
No consequences Slight Serious/remarkable Big Very big Very big Big Remarkable Slight No consequences Treatment classification
5 Very common
Appears atleast 10 times a year
80-100% Very common Slight Moderate Serious Unbareable Unbareable Very remarkable Very remarkable Remarkable Moderate Slight
V class V+ class
4 Common
Appears atleast once a year
60-80% Common Negligible Slight Moderate Serious Unbareable Very remarkable Remarkable Moderate Slight Negligible
IV class IV+ class
3 Occasional
Appears atleast once in 10 years or once during
the project execution
40-60% Occasional Negligible Slight Moderate Moderate Serious Remarkable Moderate Moderate Slight Negligible
III class III+ class
2 Rare
Appears atleast once in 100 years or once during
the product's lifetime
20-40% Rare Negligible Negligible Slight Moderate Serious Remarkable Moderate Slight Negligible Negligible
II class II+ class
1 Very rare
Appear less than once in a 100 years
Theoretical, is not known to have occurred during
construction or use
0-20% Very rare Negligible Negligible Negligible Slight Moderate Kohtalainen Slight Negligible Negligible Negligible
I class I+ class
Negative consequence seriousness / magnitude Positive consequence magnitude
E
ve
nt
fr
eq
ue
nc
y
Immediate action
Action in the current
project phase
Actions must be planned
To be followed
No treatment needed
A6.4 Modified risk matrix
The matrix includes the modifications related to the RM constructs Opportunity management as a part of RM and the Modified FTA risk analysis 
process.
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